

Adjusting the US relationship with Japan under President Joe Biden (2021-2025)

Tran Anh Cong

Ph.D. Student in International Relations at Hanoi University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam

Abstract: Holding the power of the US presidency since January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden and his administration have made strong adjustments to the US relationship with Japan, quite different from that of his predecessor, President Donald Trump. This article studies that adjustment. After the Introduction and before the Conclusion, is the basic content of the article, thereby expressing the author's perception, analysis, demonstration, and assessment of the foreign policy context, influencing factors, and basic areas of adjustment of the US-Japan relationship under President Joe Biden (2021-2025).

Keywords: adjustment; relationship; United States; Japan; Biden.

1. Introduction

Under President Biden, the US-Japan relationship has undergone significant adjustments, especially in the context of increased security in the Asia-Pacific region. President Biden quickly reversed many of his predecessor's policies, emphasizing the importance of alliances in US foreign policy. Cooperation between the two countries has been promoted through areas such as security-defense, economy, and responding to global challenges such as the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change.

Upgrading security-defense cooperation has become a top priority, including plans to enhance deterrence capabilities and expand the scope of US defense obligations to Japan. The two sides plan to strengthen military command structures to improve coordination in military operations. At the same time, Japan has also proactively built stronger security-defense policies, such as increasing defense budgets and investing in modern technologies.

US President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio also pledged to work together to counter China's growing influence in the region and strengthen the rules-based international order. Overall, this adjustment reflects a new phase in US-Japan relations, with the shared goal of protecting peace, stability and freedom in the Indo-Pacific region.

2. Foreign policy context and factors of adjustment

Democratic candidate Joe Biden was elected in the presidential election on November 3, 2020 and officially took office as president from January 20, 2021. The Biden administration has introduced and implemented a series of adjustments to foreign policy in general, as well as the relationship between the United States and Japan in particular, changing, differing from, or completely reversing the previous administration of President Donald Trump. This adjustment stems from the foreign policy context of the United States and is influenced by many factors, typically:

2.1. The foreign policy legacy of the Donald Trump administration

Despite many positive contributions and some breakthroughs in foreign affairs, the four-year term (2017-2021) with unpredictable foreign policies of former President Trump has caused the decline of US alliance relations. The "America First" policy emphasizes the interests of the United States and considers it the top priority in all decisions, has attacked multilateralism and caused many negative effects in the alliance relations and global network of the United States. Since taking office, Mr. Trump has proposed that his allies share defense costs with the United States for common tasks and missions. The 2017 National Security Strategy recognizes that the United States should pursue cooperation and reciprocity with their allies, partners and potential partners. Cooperation means sharing responsibilities and burdens. The United States wants its allies and partners (including Japan) to share the burden of responsibility fairly to avoid common threats. When allies pool resources and share responsibility for defending the alliance, the security burden becomes much lighter and more cost-effective. However, the Trump administration has remained closely aligned with then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad (an informal strategic forum among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), demonstrating the Trump administration's desire for the United States to remain engaged in the region and share the common goal of containing and pushing back against China's influence.

2.2. The US foreign policy shift

The two fundamental foreign policy agendas of the US under President Biden are (1) to rebuild fraying relationships with traditional allies; and (2) to establish a united front against Chinese influence. Early cabinet-level visits to Japan and South Korea in March 2021 demonstrated that the US is reaffirming its defense treaty commitments and securing host country support agreements with both allies. The Biden administration has also made clear that it views US allies and partners as indispensable “force multipliers” to strengthen the liberal international order and address a long list of global concerns. Leaders’ summits with their Japanese and South Korean counterparts have laid out ambitious agendas for global cooperation, including new bilateral climate, health, and technology mechanisms. A similar approach has been applied to the U.S.-India partnership, with officials from both sides emphasizing the need to cooperate on climate change, health, supply chain security, and technology, and highlighting expanded coordination in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa. In addition, while cabinet-level engagements with Australia have been limited to date, U.S. officials are stepping up cooperation with Australia on global health and economic initiatives, as well as promoting democratic values abroad.

The Biden administration has also sought to expand the role of certain multilateral groups involving regional allies. The United States has moved quickly to elevate the Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to a leaders-level dialogue and revived faltering trilateral relations with South Korea and Japan. The United States and its Indo-Pacific partners are signaling their intention to expand cooperation beyond security and defense, such as in health, climate change, and technology, to enhance their collective ability to deliver regional and global goods. At the same time, the United States has used significant diplomatic resources to rally European and Indian Ocean partners behind a global agenda to counter China’s ambitions and influence. Because the Biden administration views competition with China as a long-term global challenge (rather than a short-term regional goal), this agenda has prioritized coordinated support to address related issues such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, cybercrime, human rights abuses, and digital authoritarianism (Townshend & Corben, 2021).

2.3. Northeast Asia Security Situation

Many challenges to Northeast Asia security arise from historical and territorial disputes, which have not yet been resolved, such as the instability on the Korean Peninsula - with the division between the United States, Japan and South Korea on one side, and China, Russia and North Korea on the other; or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between Japan and China... In addition, the potential for a nuclear arms race still exists in the region if denuclearization efforts in North Korea fail. Furthermore, the abrogation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and Russia could also aggravate the situation if the United States decides to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the region in response to China and North Korea.

China's increasingly powerful economic and military rise also raises security concerns for neighboring countries. The growing militarization amid the current arms race between countries does not bode well for multilateral security cooperation and consensus on common threats (Swanstrom, 2020). The growing trade war and geostrategic competition between the US and China mean that Japan and South Korea face a dilemma in balancing their relations with both powers, especially with the pressure to side with their ally the United States. Under the Trump administration (2017-2021), his erratic behavior has also contributed to raising doubts about the US alliance commitments to the security of South Korea and Japan - which has a huge impact on the security of the Northeast Asian region.

Moreover, power competition has reduced the incentives for cooperation between China and the United States on issues on the Korean Peninsula, replacing them with strategic confrontation. North Korea is likely to exploit the gap and disagreement between the parties to its own advantage, thus further reducing the pressure on it to denuclearize.

2.4. The Rise of China

Since opening up to trade, foreign investment, and market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world’s fastest-growing economies, with real gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 9.5% annually through 2018 - a pace described by the World Bank as “the fastest and most sustained expansion of a major economy in history” (Morrison, 2019). China is now the United States’ largest trading partner in goods, its largest source of imports, and its third-largest export market. China is also the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities, helping to finance the federal debt and keep U.S. interest rates low.

US policymakers are also concerned about the challenges that China’s ambitious military modernization program poses to US interests in Asia and elsewhere. China’s military modernization program has attracted attention in recent years because it has significantly influenced US defense strategy, planning, budgets, and

programs, and US-China military competition has become a major factor in the overall relationship between the two countries. Since President Xi Jinping came to power, he has begun to implement many new strategies and policies, such as the “China Dream” (2012) – seen as a continuation of China’s peaceful development strategy. This doctrine is an important component of China’s “soft power” strategy, which seeks to counter perceptions that China is a threat to regional peace and security, and to help the country build a solid foundation for the development of a multi-faceted diplomatic strategy, with the aim of not only promoting the country’s innovation, but also increasing international attention on China’s stature in world politics. This was soon followed by the “Belt and Road Initiative” (2013), which focuses on connecting infrastructure such as railways, seaports, roads...; not only for developing countries but also for industrialized countries in Europe and North America that need to replace their degraded infrastructure and systems. This initiative was created to support Xi’s goal of reviving China in the “China Dream”. The “Made in China” plan (2015) outlines a 10-year roadmap for developing the manufacturing industry - an ambitious initiative of the Chinese Communist Party to turn the country into a manufacturing superpower that can compete with the United States (Hoanh, 2019). Along with the promulgation of the “nine-dash line” violating sovereignty in the East Sea and strengthening military capabilities, building artificial islands and militarization, China has begun to use force to suppress neighboring countries in the region. Since the concept of the “Chinese Dream” was introduced, China has become more aggressive and assertive in escalating tensions and sovereignty disputes over islands and seas with countries in the East Sea and East China Sea, typically the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japan, carrying out illegal construction activities on Vietnam’s Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Islands, the Scarborough Shoal dispute with the Philippines..., along with adopting and developing the Belt and Road Initiative to promote inter-regional cooperation and connectivity between countries in the Eurasian continent, expanding its influence globally.

3. Areas of Adjustment

3.1. Adjustment of Political Relations

Under President Biden, the political relations between the United States and Japan have witnessed a strong recovery, marking a new era in the development and strengthening of the alliance relations between the two countries. After taking office in January 2021, President Biden has made many drastic adjustments, aiming to change or reverse the goals and policies of the Trump administration. These actions not only reflect his commitment to restoring international relations, but also particularly emphasize the importance of building strong alliances with friendly countries, in which Japan plays an important role.

One of the most symbolic steps of this period was the first phone call between President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide immediately after Biden took office. This conversation not only demonstrated deep concern, but also showed the willingness of both sides to enhance and strengthen the alliance. During the conversation, the leaders of the two countries agreed to promote strategic cooperation, especially with the goal of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. This region not only benefits both the United States and Japan, but also contributes significantly to ensuring regional security in the context of increasing tensions with China (Son, 2021).

During his trip to Asian countries from March 13, 2021 as the head of the Pentagon in the new Biden administration, the US Secretary of Defense chose Japan as the first stop, with the goal of promoting security and military cooperation with US allies in Asia, strengthening deterrence against China, and North Korea’s nuclear program. Following that, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide visited President Biden on April 17, 2021, becoming the first foreign leader to visit the United States since Biden took office. The leaders of the two countries met and discussed a series of hot issues such as the Covid-19 pandemic, trade, 5G technology, environment and climate change, and tensions in the East Sea (Son & Tung, 2021).

On May 23, 2022, President Biden visited Japan and met with Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. The two sides shared and agreed on cooperation issues in responding to North Korea’s increasingly worrying behavior, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, US-Japan bilateral cooperation in the fields of economy, trade and high technology, and Quad cooperation with the goal of reducing China’s influence in the region and globally.

The US National Security Strategy released in October 2022 identifies China as the main long-term rival of the United States, and this is also one of the decisive factors explaining the strengthening of the US alliance with Japan and South Korea. US strategists placed Northeast Asia as a high priority in the early 2010s, and the importance of this region has continued to be strengthened under President Biden.

The most prominent activity in the adjustment and development of the political relationship between the United States and Japan is the two countries’ upgrading of the “strategic alliance” to a “global partnership”. On April 10, 2024, during Japanese Prime Minister Fumio’s 7-day official visit to the United States, the US-Japan Summit was held. The two sides agreed to raise the breadth and depth of the US-Japan alliance from a “strategic alliance” to a “global partnership”. In the joint press conference that followed, President Biden affirmed: “The

US-Japan relationship is truly a global partnership. Now, the two countries are building a stronger defense partnership and a stronger Indo-Pacific region than ever before” and emphasized that “the US-Japan alliance is a beacon for the world” (Kim Khanh, 2024). The two sides then signed more than 70 cooperation agreements on security-defense and economics, high technology, space science, energy, health, and the environment.

3.2. Adjusting economic relations

The economic relationship between the United States and Japan under President Biden is considered a remarkable and strong development, especially in the context of global turmoil and growing challenges from many sides. The Biden administration is committed to not only adjusting and strengthening the trade partnership between the two countries, but also expanding cooperation in the fields of high technology and the digital economy. In the context of the world gradually shifting to a strong digital economy, promoting cooperation in these areas becomes very important, especially when countries need to adapt quickly to the constant changes in the global market and require the development of innovative solutions to compete more effectively. Specifically, the United States and Japan have agreed to work towards developing a more innovative and sustainable economy, to ensure that both countries can take advantage of business opportunities in an increasingly connected world. The two sides have launched joint initiatives related to supply chains, with the aim of not only improving trade relations, but also mitigating risks from dependence on supply chains from unstable regions, as seen in recent crises.

In 2021, during the online talks between President Biden and Prime Minister Fumio, the two leaders discussed urgent issues such as responding to climate change - a key topic facing both countries today. Both sides are committed to reforming international trade regulations to achieve greater fairness and transparency in trade relations between countries, thereby creating a more favorable environment for businesses.

Furthermore, the United States and Japan have both clearly identified the need to ensure free trade and investment, through the “Competitive and Resilient Partnership” (CoRe) roadmap. The central goal of this roadmap is not only to respond to global economic challenges, but also to promote sustainable development, create jobs, and improve the living standards of people in both countries. This includes not only trade policies, but also high-level agreements to further strengthen security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, where the geopolitical situation is complex.

An important issue in this relationship is the signing of cooperation agreements in the field of security and defense. These agreements are not only necessary to ensure regional security, but also contribute to strengthening the economic relationship between the two countries. A solid security guarantee for commercial activities between the United States and Japan is a decisive factor in attracting investment and conducting commercial transactions effectively. These security-defense agreements not only prevent external threats, but also create a more stable and secure business environment for companies and investors from both countries, thereby contributing to sustainable economic development for both sides.

In terms of trade turnover, after the US-Japan Trade Agreement officially took effect in early 2020, US exports to the Japanese market increased from 64.02 billion USD in 2020 to 74.56 billion USD in 2021 and 80.32 billion USD in 2022; at the same time, US imports from Japan also increased from 119.51 billion USD in 2020 to 134.86 billion USD in 2021 and 148.34 billion USD in 2022. Total bilateral trade between the two countries increased from 183.53 billion USD in 2020 to 209.42 billion USD in 2021 and 228.65 billion USD in 2022. Total two-way trade between the United States and Japan has gradually recovered after the Covid-19 pandemic, and the total bilateral trade value in 2022 has exceeded the 218.07 billion USD in 2019 before the Covid-19 pandemic broke out (Statista, 2024).

3.3. Adjustments to security-defense relations

The security-defense relations between the United States and Japan during the Biden presidency have witnessed many adjustments and positive changes, marking an important stage in the history of the alliance between the two countries. The two sides made great strides on February 17, 2021 when they reached an agreement on sharing military costs for the stationing of US troops on Japanese territory, according to which Japan will pay about 201.7 billion yen (equivalent to 1.9 billion USD) in fiscal year 2021 (starting from April 2021) to support the stationing of about 55,000 US soldiers in Japan. This is evidence that the United States has made important adjustments in its security and defense policy toward Japan, because former President Trump once proposed that Japan increase the cost of supporting the maintenance of US forces stationed in Japan (also known as the “security budget”) to 8 billion USD/year, 4 times higher than before. Normally, the United States and Japan negotiate this fee every 5 years, but in 2021 it was delayed because the Trump administration asked Japan to increase the cost and Japan did not accept. President Biden's quick resolution of the issue right after his election is considered a move to strengthen Japan's trust in its alliance with the United States, opening up many

positive prospects for security and defense cooperation between the two countries in the next period (Son, 2021).

After the meeting between US President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide at the White House on April 18, 2021, the leaders of the two countries issued a Joint Statement “US-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era”, affirming that the two countries will continue to maintain the alliance relationship considered a pillar of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. The leaders of the two countries also proposed launching the “Competitive and Resilient Partnership” (CoRe) to build a new model of cooperation in the coming period. With this Joint Statement, the United States also reaffirmed Japan's security and defense support for the United States under the Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In particular, both sides acknowledged that the biggest challenge in the region today is strategic competition with China, while reaffirming the opposition of the United States and Japan to China's illegal claims and activities in the East Sea (Viet Anh, 2021).

In December 2023, the Japanese government approved its largest defense budget ever at \$300 billion, to develop and purchase long-range land-attack missiles and missile defense systems, mainly from the United States. Japan will begin deploying Tomahawk missiles (with a range of up to 1,600 km) on its military ships from 2025, after the United States agreed to sell 400 missiles to Japan in a deal estimated to be worth about \$2.35 billion (Murad Jandali, 2024).

During the April 2024 US-Japan Summit, the two sides signed more than 70 cooperation agreements, most of which were in the security-defense field. The two sides also identified close links and comprehensive development of the security-defense relationship between the United States and Japan through three issues. *First*, promote deeper security-defense integration. Both sides affirmed that the security-defense relationship between the two countries is now stronger than ever. The United States welcomed Japan's increase in defense spending to 2% of GDP, development of counterattack capabilities, and establishment of a new “Unified Operations Command” of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in fiscal year 2024. The two countries announced that they will promote modernization of the command and control systems of the U.S. military and the Japan Self-Defense Forces to achieve seamless, efficient connectivity and improved interoperability. To this end, the United States plans to transfer some command and control authority to the U.S. Forces Japan Command at Yokota Base in Tokyo. The two sides also agreed to enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. The United States will support Japan in deploying Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the two sides plan to strengthen deterrence operations in response to escalating provocations around Japan. *Second*, strengthen defense industry cooperation. The United States and Japan announced that they will use their industrial bases to build up the alliance's defense production capacity. The “Defense Industry Cooperation Acquisition and Maintenance Periodic Consultation Mechanism” (DICAS) will be established, chaired by the U.S. and Japanese Ministries of Defense, to identify priority areas for joint research and development (including the production of advanced air defense missiles, multi-role jet trainers, and other weapons and military equipment). Japan will support the U.S. military in maintaining U.S. Navy ships and U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft deployed in frontline areas. *Third*, jointly promote the alliance network. The United States and Japan announced that they will continue to strengthen their relationship with “like-minded” partners in the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries have proposed a series of measures for “small multilateral” cooperation between the US and Japan with a number of other countries, such as: building a US-Japan-Australia air defense network structure; the AUKUS bloc (including the US, UK, Australia) cooperating and linking with Japan; the US, Japan, and South Korea continuing to cooperate in annual multi-disciplinary exercises; the US, Japan, and UK will organize annual trilateral exercises from 2025... (Vu, 2024).

3.4. Adjusting the relationship on environmental and climate issues

Cooperation between the United States and Japan on environmental and climate issues tends to change based on the policy priorities of the leaders of the two countries. Under the Obama administration, the United States and Japan cooperated on a range of environmental and climate initiatives, both bilaterally through various agencies and through multilateral organizations. Under the Trump administration, US-Japan environmental and climate cooperation has shifted from climate change to regional energy security to serve the common interests of the two countries for a “free and open Indo-Pacific”.

Under the Biden administration, US-Japan relations in the field of environment and climate have been strongly adjusted through a series of policies, commitments and concrete actions to effectively deal with the global climate crisis - this is not simply a part of foreign policy, but also reflects a deep awareness of the importance of climate change for the sustainable development of both countries. The theme of cooperation between the two sides closely follows the issue of climate change so that Japan can take more practical steps in combating climate change. Climate change topics, including cooperation to expand the application of clean energy technologies across the Indo-Pacific, were the top issues discussed during US Secretary of State

Blinken's visit to Japan in March 2021. President Biden's first-day announcement of rejoining the Paris Agreement on climate, the appointment of John Kerry as special envoy for climate, and new ambitious domestic, regional, and global climate goals have demonstrated the Biden administration's interest and importance in this global issue.

3.5. Adjusting relations on high-tech issues

The US-Japan relationship under President Biden has entered an important phase of development, especially evident in the high-tech sector - one of the main pillars of the US foreign policy strategy. Under President Biden's leadership, the US administration has clearly identified new priorities to build a secure and sustainable supply chain for the semiconductor industry, as well as develop and apply other advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, information technology and telecommunications. The core goal of these efforts is to reduce dependence on China - a country that is increasingly becoming a formidable competitor not only in the economic field but also in the technological field.

The Biden administration has proactively cooperated closely with Japan in many key areas such as 5G technology, artificial intelligence and cloud computing technology. These areas not only create competitive advantages for both countries, but also contribute to enhancing their positions in the eyes of the international community. Both the United States and Japan clearly understand the importance of being leaders in the current technological revolution, especially when this technology will shape the future of the global economy and the stability of national security.

In the field of semiconductors, the United States and Japan have stepped up cooperation in chip production, forming an advanced chip supply chain. Both the United States and Japan are concerned about their dependence on Taiwanese technology as well as many other suppliers, so both countries are trying to find ways to diversify their semiconductor production sources. In mid-2022, the two countries reached a consensus on cooperation in the production of 2nm chips and more sophisticated semiconductors, and discussed a framework to prevent technology from leaking to Chinese companies. During the talks between economic officials of the two countries held in 2023, both sides confirmed the need to further strengthen the global supply chain with other partners and through multilateral commitments, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The joint statement of the leaders of the two countries said that both sides will encourage the operation of semiconductor research centers in both countries, aiming to develop related technology and resources (Xuan Phong, 2023).

3.6. Adjusting Relations on Competition and Dealing with China

The US-Japan relationship under President Biden has seen remarkable developments, especially in the context of increasing competition among global powers, with China emerging as a major challenge that cannot be ignored. The Biden administration has not only affirmed Japan as one of the United States' key allies in the Asia-Pacific region, but also reaffirmed that this alliance is strategically important in maintaining regional stability and security, as well as promoting democratic values and the rule of law.

The United States and Japan share concerns about China's position in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries distrust China's intentions and view China's growing power and influence as detrimental to their national security. This common strategic vision helps to unite the alliance and promote closer cooperation.

In the field of security and defense, cooperation between the two countries has been strengthened through many initiatives and programs to enhance Japan's defense capabilities. Specifically, Japan's defense budget has been proposed to double in the coming years, with the goal of modernizing its armed forces and developing advanced weapons to be ready to deal with military threats from China and North Korea (Binh Giang, 2024). This is not only an important step for Japan to protect its country, but also demonstrates its commitment to contributing to ensuring regional security and strengthening the US military presence in Asia.

In addition, on the foreign policy front, President Biden has emphasized the need to maintain and develop alliances with allied countries in the region, including Japan. One of the prominent mechanisms is the Quad (US-Japan-India-Australia), which was established not only to strengthen bilateral relations, but also to prevent and respond to China's growing expansion and influence in the region (Pham Binh, 2021). This policy reflects a multilateral strategy, promoting cooperation on security, economics and other global issues.

The past year 2023 witnessed closer coordination than ever between the United States and Japan, not only in the field of security and defense, but also in a series of other issues. The two countries have discussed and shaped policies to deal with security and defense challenges, improve trade relations as well as technological security, in the context of increasing competition with China. The goal of the two countries is to maintain control and manage this competition effectively, ensuring not only the interests of the United States and Japan, but also the entire Eurasian region (Lan & Huy, 2024). From there, a strong alliance between these two powers is gradually being formed, to promote peace and stability in the region and globally, at a time when geopolitical competition is becoming very strong.

4. Conclusion

Under President Biden, the relationship between the United States and Japan has undergone a period of significant adjustment, with the main goal being to restore and strengthen strategic cooperation between the two major economies. Immediately after taking office, Biden demonstrated an active and multilateral foreign policy approach, which is clearly different from the isolationist policy adopted by former President Trump. This change not only created a foundation for new cooperation opportunities, but also expanded the scope of cooperation to many important areas such as global health, climate change response, and strengthening regional security.

A notable highlight in the relationship between the United States and Japan is the increase in military cooperation. The summit meetings between President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio helped to ease disagreements related to military costs, while promoting the achievement of cost-sharing agreements for US military forces currently stationed in Japan. This not only contributes to strengthening trust in the US-Japan alliance, but also helps the two sides work more effectively in preparing to respond to common security situations. In addition, both leaders have worked closely to develop a common response policy to the emerging challenges from China, thereby increasing the ability to coordinate military operations in the region.

However, despite the positive visits and discussions, the US-Japan relationship still faces a number of important challenges. One of them is the issue of the military costs that Japan must pay for the US military presence - which often causes internal political disputes in Japan. Furthermore, strong opposition from the local community to the US military presence in Okinawa has also become a sensitive issue, with many demonstrations and protests taking place. In addition, there are a number of outstanding trade issues between the two countries that need to be resolved. All these factors, despite positive changes in the relationship, still require both the United States and Japan to make continuous efforts to maintain, strengthen and develop the special alliance relationship, in the context of an increasingly complex global strategy.

References:

- [1]. Viet Anh. (2021). *US-Japan build new-era relations*. April 19, 2021. <https://www.sggp.org.vn/my-nhat-tao-dung-quan-he-thoi-ky-moi-post590950.html>
- [2]. Pham Binh. (2021). *Trends in US-China relations during President Joe Biden's term*. July 9, 2021. <http://tapchiquptd.vn/vi/quoc-phong-quan-su-nuoc-ngoai/chieu-huong-quan-he-my-trung-quoc-trong-nhiem-ky-cua-tong-thong-joe-biden/17331.html>
- [3]. Ashley Townshend & Tom Corben. (2021). *Beyond Alliance Repair: Biden Must Do More in the Indo-Pacific*. September 13, 2021. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/beyond-alliance-repair-biden-must-do-more-in-the-indo-pacific/>
- [4]. Binh Giang. (2024). *Japan's election shock could make China more assertive*. October 29, 2024. <https://tienphong.vn/cu-soc-bau-cu-o-nhat-ban-co-the-khien-trung-quoc-quyet-liet-hon-post1686653.tpo>
- [5]. Nguyen Hai Hoanh. (2019). *Made in China 2025: China's ambition to develop its manufacturing industry*. June 27, 2019. <https://nghiencuuquocte.org/2019/06/27/madein-china-2025/>
- [6]. Do Mai Lan & Chu Cong Huy. (2024). *Looking back at US-China relations in 2023 and forecasting the trend in 2024*. March 31, 2024. <https://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/the-gioi-van-de-su-kien/-/2018/908502/nhin-lai-quan-he-my---trung-quoc-nam-2023--va-du-bao-chieu-huong-nam-2024.aspx>
- [7]. Murad Jandali. (2024). *An Unprecedented Shift: How the U.S.-Japan Alliance Reached Its Highest Level in 60 Years*. April 2024. <https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/an-unprecedented-shift-how-the-us-japan-alliance-reached-its-highest-level-in-60-years>
- [8]. Kim Khanh. (2024). *The Trip to Upgrade the Strategic Alliance*. April 12, 2024. <https://cand.com.vn/binh-luan-quoc-te/chuyen-cong-du-nang-cap-moi-quan-he-dong-minh-chien-luoc-i728021/>
- [9]. Wayne M. Morrison. (2019). *China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States*. June 25, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190625_RL33534_088c5467dd11365dd4ab5f72133db289fa10030f.pdf
- [10]. Xuan Phong. (2023). *Japan and the United States Cooperate to Develop Next-Generation Semiconductors*. May 27, 2023. <https://www.vietnamplus.vn/nhat-ban-va-my-hop-tac-phat-trien-chat-ban-dan-the-he-tiep-theo-post864872.vnp>
- [11]. Nguyen Tran Xuan Son. (2021). *Prospects for US-Japan relations under US President Joe Biden*. March 23, 2021. https://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/tin-binh-luan/-/asset_publisher/DLIYi5AJyFzY/content/trien-vong-quan-he-my-nhat-ban-duoi-thoi-tong-thong-my-joe-biden

- [12]. Statista. (2024). *Growth of the real gross domestic product (GDP) in Japan from 1st quarter 2017 to 2nd quarter 2024*. October 16, 2024. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/276942/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-japan-by-quarter/>
- [13]. Niklas Swanström. (2020). *The Case for Multilateralism: The Korean Peninsula in a Regional Context*. June 04, 2020. <https://isdpr.eu/publication/case-multilateralismkorean-peninsula-regional-context/>
- [14]. Truong Son & Cong Tung. (2021). *US President Joe Biden welcomes Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide at the White House*. April 17, 2021. <https://vtv.vn/the-gioi/tong-thong-my-joe-biden-tiep-don-thu-tuong-nhat-ban-suga-yoshihide-tai-nha-trang-202104170628193.htm>
- [15]. Hang Hao Vu. (2024). *Potential risks from “upgrading” the US-Japan alliance*. May 15, 2024. <https://nghienluc.org/rui-ro-tiem-an-tu-viec-nang-cap-lien-minh-my-nhat-ban/>