Pity as an element of education for the formation of virtuous citizens

Anastasia Dimitrakopoulou
Hellenic Open University
Faron 18, Kalamata 24100, Greece

Abstract: Pity is a social emotion, which, if developed through education, can motivate students to action. All societies are able to exploit the advantages of pity for the benefit of the common good. Let it not escape us that man lives within the social and political framework, coexists with other people and therefore, his life is directly connected to the course of society. In the present study we will seek to investigate the way pity is developed through education and its importance for a society.

Keywords: Education, pity, society, citizens.

1. Introduction

In this paper we will explore the pedagogical dimension of the concept of pity and focus on the way in which it can contribute to shaping the character of students, so that they become conscientious citizens. The concept of pity from ancient times to our time has caused many debates and disagreements, as some of the philosophers believe that it can contribute to the creation of virtuous societies, while others argue that pity creates lazy citizens.

Education does not consist in the transmission of knowledge, but is a birth, which marks the appearance of something new in the soul. Education is a creative force and aims to create autonomous people (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 206 b). An expression of people's morals, in our opinion, is the concept of pity, which can be reduced to a virtue, as it is connected to the highest of virtues, justice.

2. Definition of the concept of pity

Aristotle in his work *Rhetoric* defines the concept of pity saying that: "pity is sorrow for some manifest evil painfully destructive to a person who does not deserve to suffer it, an evil which anyone could expect to offend him or someone of his own and indeed, when this evil seems close. It is, indeed, evident that the man who is to be pitied must necessarily be in such a state as to believe that it is possible for him to suffer some evil—himself or one of his own—an evil like that which we have said in our definition, similar or similar[1]". From the above, we understand that pity is the inherent, psychological ability of human nature to move to the painful position of the other person, which means that the person suffers with the one who suffers, understands him and activates within him "the consciousness of the universality of finite man, which instills in him the fear of the possible exposure of the same to the corresponding pain" (Kopsida-Vretou, 2022).Pity takes two forms; one form is the instinctive urge, which prompts man to expel the sorrow he feels when he sees the misery of another. The other form of pity consists in creative pity, when, that is, the person contributes to the relief of the other person, even if he faces difficulties (Sweig, 2012). The feeling of pity is not mobilized in all people, but in some, such as people who believe that they could suffer some harm or have already suffered and survived, old people, because they have wisdom and experience, the sick, those who display excessive cowardice, the educated people, because they understand things deeply and those who have family, i.e. parents, children or wives. On the contrary, people who are in an intense mental and emotional state are unable to feel pity, just like those who do not feel fear, because they are exclusively concerned with themselves: "διοοῦτεοί παντελῶς ἀπολωλότεςἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲνγὰρἂνἔτι παθεῖνοῖονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ), οὔτεοί ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οιόμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰγὰρ ἅπαντα οἴονταιὑπάρχειντἀγαθά, δῆλονότι καὶ τὸμὴνδέχεσθαι παθεῖνμηδὲν κακόν· καὶ γὰρτοῦτοτῶνἀγαθῶν. εἰσὶδὲτοιοῦτοιοῖοινομίζειν παθεῖν, οἵτε πεπονθότεςήδη καὶ διαπεφευγότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰτὸφρονεῖν καὶ δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ οἱἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱδειλότεροιμᾶλλον, καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· εὐλόγιστοιγάρ. καὶοἷς ὑπάρχουσιγονεῖς ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες· αὐτοῦτεγὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖντἀειρημένα. καὶ οἱμήτεἐνἀνδρείας πάθειὂντες, οἷονἐνὀργῇ ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρτοῦεσομένου ταῦτα), μήτεἐν ὑβριστικῇδιαθέσει (καὶ γὰροὗτοιαλόγιστοιτοῦ πείσεσθαί τι), ἀλλ᾽ οἱμεταξὺ τούτων, μήτ᾽ αὖ φοβούμενοι

---

[1]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1385 b: "ἔστωδὴἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶφαινομένῳκακῷφθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷτοῦἀναξίουτυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂναὐτὸςπροσδοκήσειενἂνπαθεῖν ἢ τῶναὑτοῦτινα, καὶτοῦτοὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται· δῆλονγὰρὅτιἀνάγκητὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσεινὑπάρχειντοιοῦτονοἷονοἴεσθαιπαθεῖνἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶναὑτοῦτινα, καὶτοιοῦτοκακὸνοἷονεἴρηταιἐντῷὅρῳ ἢ ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιο".

σφόδρα· οὐγὰρἐλεοῦσινοἱἐκπεπληγμένοι, διὰτὸεῖναι πρὸςτῷοἰκείῳ πάθει" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1385 b). Moreover, it is very difficult for the happy man or the completely unhappy man to feel pity for his fellow man, because the former displays "arrogant self-confidence, the latter complete indifference to what is happening, because he considers himself to have experienced utter failure" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1385 b-1386 b.).

Does man that is, feel pity for any problem of the other person or does it depends on the circumstances? The answer is that man does not feel pity for the sufferings of all men, for example, he will feel pity for a man who suffers from his own fault considering, however, the magnitude of the fault. In the Aristotelian work Rhetoric mention is made of the events that cause pain to people and the philosopher divides them into two categories; to the first category belong to death, physical injury, old age, disease and lack of food. The second category includes pain, which results from psychological causes, such as the partial or total absence of friends, separation from friends and relatives:"διὸ καὶ τὸδιασπᾶσθαι ἀπό φίλων καὶ συνήθωνἐλεεινο" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1385 b) the weakness or the deformity, the good that does not come, while the bad comes in its place, or that the good arrives, when the worst has already happened and the pain overlaps any joy. Aristotle connects the concept of mercy with suffering. Pity, according to the philosopher, is activated when people consider that they are going to experience the same events as their fellow human beings who are suffering. In the definition of tragedy, Aristotle says that: "δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴντῶντοιούτων παθημάτωνκάθαρσιν" (Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1449 b) which means that the spectator moves to the place of the heroes and experiences their misfortunes, as he shares in the pain and deprivation, but and in suffering, which man is unable to face, because he does not know the way or does not have the required powers.

Pity involves three characteristic thoughts: that some serious harm has happened to someone else, that it did not happen because of that person, and that it is something that may be suffered, either by one or by someone directly concerned (Nussbaum, 2015).The question that arises, in relation to pity, is whether we should also consider the conditions under which someone is in an unfortunate position. For example, if someone wants to harm themselves should they attract our pity? Nussbaum claims yes, because "the magnitude of the pain is overwhelmingly greater than the magnitude of the error" (Nussbaum, 2015).

Another question that could be asked is the following: do all people or those connected with us, i.e. are they familiar persons or dear beings cause our pity? Also, do all people attach the same importance to pity to the same things, or does it depend on the hierarchy of values? Usually, the people who cause our pity are intertwined with our lives. But in the case of our family members, people feel if they themselves were to suffer something bad; in this case the feeling of pity is replaced by terror (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1385 b-1386 b).

In the ancient Greek intellect, in the modern one, as well as the modern one, not all philosophers accept the concept of pity. Plato and some of the Stoics associate pity with femininity while resistance to pain with courage (Plato, *State*, 388 A). The concept of pity also depends on the cultural standards of each era, which is also accepted by A. Smith, who generally considers that pity is a cultural trait. In fact, he gives as an example the wild peoples of North America, who, in whatever situation they find themselves, do not destroy them. Smith disagrees with the Stoic proposition that we should not feel sorry for the sufferings of our friends and family, because in doing so, the bonds of family and community are undermined (Smith, 2012; Nussbaum, 2015). But he agrees with their view that a proper man does not see the misfortunes of life as opportunities for lamentation or for the pity of others. Smith accepts that we should be sorry for the calamities that befall loved ones, but in our own calamities it is preferable to have a stoic response and to live a stoic inner life (Smith, 2012; Nussbaum, 2015). His theory, according to Nussbaum, is paradoxical, because it is not possible to feel pity for the misfortunes of others and not to accept pity for our own misfortunes (Nussbaum, 2015).

In modern science, pity is not accepted by F. Nietzsche, who perceives it as a sign of human vulnerability: "I understood that the ever-spreading ethics of pity, which caught even the philosophers, was the ominous symptom of a now ominous European culture"(Nietzsche, 2012).

3. Exploring the concept of pity

The concept of pity is a matter of conscience. Plato in The aetitus (190 a) states that: "Λόγονὂναὐτὴπρὸςαὑτὴνἡψυχὴδιεξέρχεταιπεριῶνἂνσκοπῆ. ὥςγεμὴεἰδὼςσοιἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτογάρμοιἰνδάλλεταιδιανοουμένηοὐκἄλλοτιἢδιαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴἑαυτὴνἐρωτῶσακαὶἀποκρινομένη, καὶφάσκουσακαὶοὐφάσκουσα. ὅτανδὲὁρίσασα, εἴτεβραδύτερονεἴτεκαὶὀξύτερονἐπάξασα, τὸαὐτὸἤδηφῇκαὶμὴδιστάζῃ, δόξανταύτηντίθεμεναὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἔγωγετὸδοξάζεινλέγεινκαλῶκαὶτὴνδόξανλόγονεἰρημένον, οὐμέντοιπρὸςἄλλονοὐδὲφωνῇ, ἀλλὰσιγῇπρὸςαὑτόν·οὐδὲτί;" The man, that is, does not act immediately, but converses with himself and decides to act, as long as there are no doubts about the specific act. This means that pity is an issue that touches the moral and spiritual behavior of man; therefore it requires the existence of a specific behavior from man and therefore, the awareness of people (Papalexiou, 2016). The manifestation of pity towards fellow human beings is not a spontaneous and instinctive action, but the result of the will, knowledge and experience of the acting

person. Or as Aristotle would claim "pity is the result of man's decision, however, a man who has a correct way of thinking, both intellectually and morally, that is, he has wisdom" (Papalexiou, 2016).

At this point questions are raised about pity. Is there a connection between pity and rage? If you sympathize with someone for what has happened to them, is it possible for them to react with anger? Starting from the last question, we would say that people who suffer are used to hating and being angry with others. An example of such a reaction was Philoctetes, who remained locked up on an island, sick, abandoned by his companions and without other people near him. Can we justify Philoctetes' reaction? The answer is affirmative; as long as we consider that his behavior is also determined by his sense of justice. M. Nussbaum considers that "an important task of the ethics of pity is to set limits to anger and the desire for revenge. In this he could be helped by a stoic sense of the equality of all human animals" Therefore, we can understand Philoctetes' way of reaction, but not accept it. Often, the suffering man experiences a contradiction since on the one hand, he wishes to elicit the pity of his fellow men and on the other hand, he feels a feeling of revenge, wishing that they should suffer as he himself (Nussbaum, 2015). The ethics of pity is tasked with setting limits to anger and the desire for revenge. This attitude to life is consistent with the views of the Stoic philosophers, who perceive man as a being free from passions, emotions and material attachments, because emotion makes people soft, passive and incapable of right action (Smith, 2012).

In the manifestation of pity, egoism is a serious obstacle, and when it is absent, people tend to feel pity by thinking of another's story of suffering (Nussbaum, 2015). Compassion assigns moral value to an act with the ultimate goal of the well-being of another. In relation to the problem of egoism, Schopenhauer referred to the absolute unity of existence and the only superficial distinction of individuals (Cartwright, 1988). According to A. Schopenhauer, the motives of human actions are: 1\ human selfishness, which is without limits and serves the same benefit, 2\ malice, which wants the evil of others and 3\ mercy, which wants the good of the other (Schopenhauer, 2003). Man as an entity is possessed of a distinction in emotions, education can instill in those principles, which will consolidate the beneficial dispositions of man and mobilize emotions, such as pity, which can direct man to perform actions with an exclusively the common interest.

Motivation is very important in the performance of an act because everyone is impelled by some reason every time they act. Interests, feelings and desires are perceived as motives. It is, therefore, a rational and ethical behavior in this sense. But how is it possible that the interests of others motivate us in general to perform an act and to manifest a certain behavior? On this Nagel argues that all people have the ability to think in an abstract way about the world. "The combinatorial abstraction of thought also operates in situations of moral behavior. In this case the view includes all individuals but the individual person's thinking on moral issues does not stand out as unique, as in the personal view. This ideal abstraction results in the impersonal point of view" (Penner, 1995).

According to the aforementioned view, is pity connected to reason and morality? Can a man compromise his own interests by serving the interests of another? In this case, will the decision rest on ethics and logical thinking, or will emotion come into play? We consider that most likely; if it is our own person we will undermine our interests. Pity, if connected with feeling and not reason, will be an act of charity. A. Smith argues that individuals are selfish because the propensity to exchange and trade satisfies selfish desires and is inherent in human nature (Smith, 1976). On one side there is selfishness and on the opposite side there is pity, which pushes to help fellow human beings (Karaphyllis, 2003). Selfishness is serious obstacles to the manifestation of pity when it is not there, then people tend to feel pity by thinking about the story of someone else's suffering. Compassion assigns moral value to an act with the ultimate goal of the well-being of another (Cartwright, 1998).

4. Education and pity

Aristotle had pointed out that man is a political being (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1252 a 2-3). He is destined by nature to live within political society, which means that he must transcend individuality and actively participate in society. Political coexistence "presupposes the awareness of the difference between living in a place and the living of existing relationships between the city and the citizens who share the fact of their participation in the risks of the whole as a hope of self-realization and an expectation of the historical continuity of their existence´´ (Petsios, 2016). Within the political framework, citizens become aware that the city functions as the value project, giving meaning to all aspects of human life and, in addition, it has a normative role in the area of ethics, regulating the way citizens behave, who they must behave "with magnanimity ... and civilly" (Demosthenes, *Epistoles*, 9). Human energy also involves political influence, which means that pity is transformed into a political act, determining political behavior due to common fate. Pity contributes to the political and social dimension of human nature and realizes magnanimity. This is because pity is a valuable social emotion without which it would be difficult to establish proper political communities. In this sense, it can take the form of a social vision. Pity is necessary in a society to strengthen established social practices and can contribute to the achievement of happiness, because "it is a consequence of the injustices that exist in a society and therefore concern all citizens" (Stark, 2019).

J.J. Rousseau, in particular, in the work of *Emilius* deals extensively with pity and its social role, as he connects it with the possibility of democratic government, which is correct, because pity brings people together into a single and organized whole of "the thinking of their common weakness and vulnerability, undermining hierarchies based on office, social status and wealth" (Nussbaum, 2015). When man acts he is involved with the rest of the citizens and at the same time his actions express his personality (Jones, 2003). In this sense, personal responsibility is underlined, which unquestionably affects the relationship with the other person and determines in an absolute and essential way the moral virtue and the ideal of the happy life within the political context. Man's act is a personal creation; man as a self-sufficient personality acts freely and responsibly, valuing life and setting values or assigning new measures to existing ones. The road that every citizen is called to walk is not easy, but many times there are thorny points, in particular, when the person resists the existing social rules and refuses to bind himself within them. Usually, people choose to conform to the behavior of the group, obeying the instinct of social acceptance and self-preservation. Those who choose a path different from that of the herd attract pity because they are considered unlucky. In this case, pity functions as disapproval (Papanoutsos, 1995).

Rousseau considers that pity contributes to the humanization of man, since he himself develops reason in such a way as to balance his two natural feelings of self-preservation and pity. Man no longer acts based on the instinct of self-preservation, because he can foresee the consequences of his actions (Rousseau,1979). In this way, the moral man uses pity and his reason prevents himself from acting in a harmful way, promoting his survival. Pity is the principle of human action when man is in the natural state, while it is eliminated or diminished when man enters civil society: "[Pity may be] nothing but a sentiment that puts us in the place of him who suffers, a sentiment that is obscure and lively in Savage man, developed but weak in Civil man […] Indeed, commiseration will be all the more energetic in proportion as the On looking animal identifies more intimately with the suffering animal: Now this identification must, clearly, have been infinitely closer in the state of Nature than in the state of reasoning. It is reason that engenders amour propre, and reflection that reinforces it; reason that turns man back upon him; reason that separates him from everything that troubles and afflicts him: It is Philosophy that isolates him; by means of Philosophy he secretly says, at the sight of a suffering man, perish if you wish, I am safe" (Rousseau,1985). Civil society replaces the absence of pity with duties and laws. Therefore, pity is weakened and perceived as a corruption of man:"[The] transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most remarkable change in man by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and endowing his actions with the morality they previously lacked. Only then, when the voice of duty succeeds physical impulsion and right succeeds appetite, does man, who until then had looked only to himself, see himself forced to act upon other principles and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations" (Rousseau, 2014). According to the above passage, Rousseau points out that man entering civil society is deprived of his impulsive behavior, which becomes deliberative, since he must act in a rational way, considering all the parameters and softening his impulses. Man, acting on the basis of pity within political society, serves the necessity of harmonious social coexistence(Macherey, 2019).Yet Rousseau does not abhor duties; duty does not replace instincts, but is the recognition that man must act according to reason, after modifying pity. Man, if he succeeds in maintaining the original feelings of love and pity and uses his reason to curb the impulses will be a moral man. In the fourth book of *Emilius*, the feeling of pity plays a vital role in establishing moral relations with other people, as man is able to understand the human condition. The understanding of the human condition refers to the way of recognizing the weakness of the members of a society, who come together, aiming to satisfy their needs. This process, according to Rousseau, leads to the awareness of the evils that human beings may suffer and leads to the development of the feeling of pity. The experience of suffering itself makes the student empathetic and directs him to identify with himself and other people. In this way, man knows "the tenderness of humanity, but also the sweetness of sympathy" and socializes (Rousseau,1979).

The concept of pity puts the other at the center, which means that selfish dispositions cease to exist. Therefore, it is imperative that the educational system inculcates in students the values that will lead to the manifestation of the feeling of pity. Especially, nowadays, when there is a danger that education will lose its primary purpose, which is the formation of moral characters.Unfortunately, at a global level it is observed that education tends to the professional preparation of young people and that the educational role of the citizen is abandoned.Education, when it does not aim to educate students, is an insidious form of alienation and alienation. Within the educational context, education finds its destination and ensures the conditions of a comfortable and pleasant life, which is based on moral virtues (Kazepidis, 1998). According to research, it has been observed that the provision of altruistic help to others appears very early in human life, around the age of 18 months, when infants were observed helping adults who were in need. Man, that is, possesses the structures on which morality develops, without this meaning that the realization of morality is the exclusive result of some inherited adaptive mechanism (Pneumatikos, 2010). Therefore, the educational system is an important parameter in shaping the moral behavior of children, as it must make known to students the normative framework of

society, which distinguishes behaviors as good and desirable and as bad and undesirable. In addition, the educational system must instill principles in students, but also shape their ability to curb their egocentric impulses. Only in this way, students will prioritize the collective good over the individual good and acquire a personal, moral identity (Pneumatikos, 2010).We could not omit in a study on the concept of pity, the role of the mass media, which contribute to connecting our imagination with the suffering of people around the world and thus the problem of pity to be overcome (Nussbaum, 2015). Of course, the image of suffering fades when the story or event is over and so the importance of education is overstated to ensure that pity does not dissipate. In the school environment, pity is preserved through the study of familiar stories, such as tragedy, and by discussing important events that humanity has experienced and is experiencing. The promotion of compassion is possible through the universal dimension of education. Claiming justice and a decent living are common demands that concern all citizens of the world. Therefore, it is necessary to sensitize children to value issues, so that they acquire empathy and undiminished interest in the problems of others. Of course, there is also the opposite point of view, such as that expressed by existentialist philosophers, who oppose the coexistence and channeling of values derived from society in the field of education. Their pedagogical concepts are determined, as is reasonable, by the way in which they understand the relationship between man and political society. Heidegger perceives man as a being, who by chance has found himself in a hostile and open universe, as he characteristically says in the "zero of the world"(Heidegger,1978). Man lives in a world that has no meaning for him and he is forced to submit to the desire of a mass coexistence, which deprives him of authenticity and forces him to "be" only "due to others"(Heidegger, 1978). J.-P. Sartre comments on the above views, saying that people participating in a social context are like oarsmen, who row, obeying the rhythmic cries of an invisible helmsman, sacrificing their flesh "on the altar of a common purpose that resembles termination in front of the clamorous and indifferent crowds of spectator's"(Sartre, 2008). Sartre accepts the coexistence of people, but he does not perceive it as the essence of relationships but as a conscious conflict. Between people there is a gap, a dividing zero on which the fragility of human relations is built(Sartre, 2008).The other person is perceived by man as an image and this exchange of eyes takes on the character of conflict, where each seeks to remove the subjectivity of the other and turn him into an object: "the world exists outside of me" everything has now come to possession of the Other... "My original sin is the existence of the Other" (Sartre, 2008). These views bring consequences to pedagogy, first of all, due to the conflictual disposition of people, which excludes education from the possibility of substantial adaptation. Education guides the young man with a view to the development of his spiritual and moral powers on the basis of predetermined value standards. With Existentialism it is impossible to carry out this process, because the pedagogical relationship that develops between the educator and the educated is considered overestimated, which leads man to insecurity, but at the same time to shape his world in any way he wishes (Papanoutsos, 1997).Although, the traditional education is not completely affected the educator continues to tutor the student because of his incapacity, which comes from the immaturity of his age and theinability to survive, relying on his own strength (Karakatsanis, 1991).

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

Concluding the present study, we would say that pity is not intertwined with generosity, which means that it does not bring pleasure to man, but it is a difficult virtue, because it requires giving, participation in the suffering and sufferings of others and great mental strength. Nevertheless, people experience mental satisfaction as a reward in this process. Pity is an emotion and a virtue, and at the same time, it combines other virtues. Pity is the motive, which directs to higher virtues, such as justice. In fact, it leads man to virtuous behavior, because he reduces selfishness by seeing others suffer.

Through education, it is necessary to develop the concept of pity in young people, forming an embankment in the projection of the multitude of images of violence and misery, which run through the television screens, causing people apathy and preventing the development of higher emotions, e.g. as pity.

References

[1]. D. E. Cartwright, "Schopenhauer's Compassion and Nietzsche's Pity", Schopenhauer Jahrbuch 69, pp. 557-567, 1988.
[2]. M.Heidegger, It is also Time, Dodoni, Athens, 1978.
[3]. D. James,"Rousseau on Needs, Language and Pity: The Limits of Public Reason", European Journal of Political Theory 10(3),pp. 372–393, 2011.
[4]. D. Jones,"The Origins of Global Cities: Ethics and Morality in Contemporary Cosmopolitanism", British Journal of Politics and International relations, 5, 1,pp. 50-73, 2003.
[5]. G. Karaphyllis,"Philosophical Approach to Altruism", Scientific Yearbook of the Department of Education DE, (16), pp. 57-83.Ioannina, 2003.
[6]. T. Kazepidis, The Philosophy of Education, Vanias, Thessaloniki, 1998.

[7].   P. Karakatsanis, Philosophy of Education, Alexandroupoli, 1991.
[8].   P.Kopsida-Vretou, About Pandemic and Pity.At https://diastixo.gr/arthra/, 2021.Retrieved 20\12\2022.
[9].   P. Macherey, Rousseau: Vital Instinct and Pity. Systems of Life: Biopolitics, Economics, and Literature on the Cusp of Modernity, Fordham University Press, New York, 2019.
[10]. F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Ethics,(trans.) Z. Sarikas, Paneopticon, Athens, 2012.
[11]. M. Nussbaum, the Ethics of Pity, (trans.) F. Terzakis- G. Lykiardopoulos, Erasmus, Athens, 2015.
[12]. K. Papalexiou, (2016). "Friendship and Solidarity", Filosofein, issue 13, pp.2016.
[13]. E. Papanoutsos, "Pedagogical Eros, Philosophy and Education", pp. 98-113, 1997.
[14]. E. Papanoutsos, Ethics, Dodoni, Athens, 1995.
[15]. P. Penner, "Altruistic Behavior: An Inquiry into Motivation", Value Inquiry Book Series, No 35, January 1, 1995.
[16]. K. Petsios, Logos and Polis in Classical Thought. Philosophy, (14), pp. 147-159, 2016.
[17]. D. Pneumatikos, "Teaching Children to Be Moral", Ethics and Education: Dilemmas and Perspectives. (ed.) M. Sakellariou, Kritiki, Athens, 2010.
[18]. J.-J. Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality. Paperback, UK., 1985.
[19]. J.-J.Rousseau, The Social Contract, Paperback, UK., 2014.
[20]. J.-J. Rousseau, (1959–95) 'Emile ou de l'e´ducation', in Rousseau (n. 3), vol. 4,. Eng. tr.: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or on Education, tr. Allan Bloom, Basic Books, New York, 1979.
[21]. J.-P.Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (trans.) K. Papagiorgis, Papazisis, Athens, 2008.
[22]. A. Schopenhauer,(2003)The Passions of the World. Thoughts and passages. (trans.) Ilias Nikoloudis, Printa, Athens, 2003.
[23]. A. Smith, the Theory of Moral Emotions. (trans.) D. Drossos. Papazisis, Athens, 2012.
[24]. A. Smith, an Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Clarendon press, Oxford, 1976.
[25]. S. Stark, "Commentary on Kelly Arenson, Some Doubts about the Moral Value of Pity". Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. XXXIV, pp. 1-13, 2019.
[26]. S. Sweig, Epikindynos Oiktos, (trans.) M. Kranaki, Agra, Athens, 2012.