The 2016 shift from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy in the USA: Pointing out the structure of Trumpconomics, its meaning, and its expected local and global implications, both analytically and graphically

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Abstract: The world of extreme democratic outcomes came in 2016 first in the UK with the unexpected win of the “yes” vote; and months later in the USA with the unexpected win of Donald Trump. This is a shift in the working of democracy from normal to extreme structure as in extreme liberal democracies pushing the best interest of the minority view that surprisingly wins a majority rule based democratic outcome is the core goal. In other words, extreme democratic outcomes exist to push the best interest of the minority view, not the best interest of the majority as normal democratic outcomes are expected to do.

As extreme liberal democracies need targeted chaos first to come to exist, and later to persist, not surprisingly the UK and the USA has been under constant targeted chaos since 2016, which continues today. Hence, it can be said that both BREXIT and USEXIT are twins with the same extreme liberal democracy structure; and therefore, with the same extreme economic thinking mentality that is needed to support the implementation of the minority view that wins a democratic contest under targeted chaos. The author calls the environment of division in the UK just before and after the 2016 BREXIT vote the world of Brexconomics; and he calls the environment of division in the USA just before and after the 2016 USEXIT vote the world of Trumpconomics. Notice that the surface on top of which extreme forms of economic thinking like Brexconomics and Trumpconomics flourish is targeted chaos; and this economic thinking under chaos supports the actions of extreme democratic outcomes like BREXIT and USEXIT to advance the interest of the minority view that won the democratic contest.

Yet, despite the turmoil that normal liberal democratic forces and institutions in both the UK due to BREXIT and the USA due to USEXIT have been enduring ongoing since 2016 it seems democracy thinkers and political stakeholder affected in both countries did not see in 2016, and in my view, have not been able to see yet even now in 2019 that a fundamental and systematic paradigm shift that has taken place: the system structure of the extreme liberal democracy model in place now since 2016 is systematically the opposite as or fully opposite to that of the system structure that normal liberal democracy had before 2016; and therefore, an extreme democratic outcome does not work while inside normal liberal democracy rules and institutions in which it comes to exist; and in order to work the extreme democratic outcome has to find ways to twist those normal rules and institutions or it has to destroy them to create its own supporting extreme rules and extreme institutions.

And without this basic understanding of the paradigm shift that has taken place it is difficult for those inside the normal liberal democracy box to see the following: a) it is difficult to see the long term danger in which normal democratic values and institutions are while under extreme minority rule; and b) it is difficult to frame the way extreme liberal democracy works or the way it can slowly advance its minority view agenda; and use this understanding to uncover ways to guide effective opposition. This paper focuses on the 2016 extreme case in the USA or USEXIT with the election of President Trump, but the structures and implications apply to 2016 BREXIT too. Among the goals of this article is to point out the structure of Trumpconomics, its meaning, and its expected local and global implications, both analytically and graphically.

Key words: Normal democratic outcome, extreme democratic outcome, BREXIT, USEXIT, normal liberal democracy, extreme liberal democracy, liberal democracy, paradigm shift, economics, Trumpconomics, Brexconomics, Reaganomics, morality, amorality

Introduction

a) Normal liberal democracy

A normal liberal democracy(NLD) under a majority rule voting system is the one where the majority view wins the democratic contest leading to a normal democratic outcome(NDQ)(Muñoz 2017a) , an outcome that aims at putting the best interest of the majority first. In this normal liberal democracy world there can be different competing views on how to champion the best interest of the majority such as morality view based
development or practicality view based development. For example, in the USA before 2016 the political power needed to pursue competing views of development with the best interest of the majority in mind was achieved by alternating liberal governments and democratic governments (Muñoz 2015).

b) The components of a normal liberal democracy

The components of a normal liberal democracy needed to efficiently advance the best interest of the majority can be appreciated as in Figure 1 below:

![Normal liberal democracy diagram](image)

**Figure 1** The structure of normal liberal democracy has four components, EDO, NDV, NEC and stability as represented by the continuous black arrows.

Figure 1 above tells us that the structure of a normal liberal democracy (NLD) has four components: i) A normal democratic outcome (NDO) supported by normal democratic institutions; ii) A normal economic thinking system (NEC) supported by mainstream economic thinking usually a la Adam Smith; iii) A normal set of democratic values (NDV) such as the respect of law, science, and morality; and iv) A stable linking environment to advance freedom and prosperity as indicated by the continuous black arrows.

All components of the normal liberal democracy (NLD) are geared to reflecting or advancing the best interest of the majority, locally and globally, in policy, action or institutional, in economic thinking, in democratic values, and in stability. This is because under normal liberal democracy the best interest of the majority or the common good is put first.

c) The structure of the shift from the world of normal liberal democracies to the world of extreme liberal democracies

Consistent with Figure 1 above when majority rule based normal liberal democracies (NLD) shift to extreme liberal democracies (ELD) four things shift at the same time, the nature of democratic outcome (DO); the nature of economic thinking that support it (EC); the nature of the democratic values (DV); and the nature of linking stability environment between the components as it can be seen in Figure 2 below:
Hence the resulting paradigm after the shift to extreme liberal democracy (ELD) under majority rule based voting system as indicated in Figure 2 above has i) a different type of democratic outcome (EDO), now extreme, ii) a different type of economic thought (EEC), now extreme; iii) a different type of values (EDV), now extreme; and iv) a different type of stability environment linking all components, now extreme.

Therefore, this shift from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy is a shift from normal democratic conditions to extreme democratic conditions. It has been said that extreme liberal democracies can be thought as outside down normal liberal democracies or outside down democratic outcomes (Muñoz 2017b), where there is a shift from morality based decision making to amorality based one (Muñoz 2019)

d) The structure of extreme liberal democracies

The extreme components of the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) then can be highlighted as in Figure 3 below:

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**Figure 2** The structure of the shift from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy

Four components shift at the same time, the type of democratic outcome, the type of stability, the type of values, and the type of economic thinking.

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**Figure 3** The world of extreme liberal democracy

Extreme democratic outcome (EDO), extreme economic thinking (EEC) and extreme democratic values (EDV) under instability (broken arrows).
The four components of extreme liberal democracies (ELD) depicted in Figure 3 above are i) an extreme democratic outcome (EDO) which cannot work under normal democratic institutions, ii) an extreme version of economic thinking (EEC) inconsistent with normal economic thinking based on protectionist policies and rules, iii) an extreme version of democratic values (EDV), based on contempt for the rule of law, for science, and for morality; and iv) a chaotic linking environment between components as indicated by the broken line.

All components of the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) are geared at pushing or implementing the best interest of the minority view in policy, actions or institutional, in economic policy, in values, and stability, regardless of the cost, including the cost, expected or not, that even minority view stakeholder may bear as a result of this policy implementation. It has been pointed out that a) when the minority view wins a majority rule based democratic contest, then we have an extreme democratic outcome (EDO) (Muñoz 2018); and b) that without true majority view targeted chaos during a democratic contest there cannot be extreme democratic outcomes as chaos is why extreme liberal democracies come to exist and persist (Muñoz 2019).

e) The need to understand the nature of Trumpconomics and its local and global implications

It is well-known now that targeted chaos had a main role in the 2016 UK-BREXIT (BT 2016; Grice 2017) with the unexpected win of the “yes” vote (BBC 2016) as well as with and the 2016 USA-USEXIT (Horton 2016; Rogers and Bromwich 2016), with the unexpected win of Donald Trump (Ingram 2016), two extreme democratic outcomes that live for and persist because of permanent targeted chaos. The author calls the environment of division in the UK just before and after the 2016 BREXIT vote the world of Brexonomics; and the environment of division in the USA just before and after 2016 USEXIT vote the world of Trumponomics, they are twins with the same extreme liberal democracy structure; and therefore, with the same extreme economic thinking mentality needed to pursue a minority held view that wins a democratic process under targeted chaos. In other words, targeted chaos separates normal economic thinking from Brexonomics and Trumponomics. Therefore, Trumponomics is more than the economic policies of President Trump or Trumponomics (Investopedia 2019) as it is about policies under targeted chaos or chaotic environment (Analyse Financiere 2017; House 2019). And notice that unlike Reaganomics, which for example is free trade based and against debt (Griswold 2004), Trumponomics is protectionism based (Gaouette 2017) and for debt (Stein 2018).

Yet, despite the turmoil that normal liberal democratic forces and institutions in both the UK due to BREXIT (PBS 2019; TI 2019) and in the USA due to USEXIT (Otis 2019; Chapman 2019) have been enduring ongoing since 2016 it seems democracy thinkers and political stakeholder affected in both countries did not see in 2016, and in my view, they have not been able to see yet even now in 2019 that a fundamental and systematic paradigm shift has taken place since 2016: The system structure of extreme liberal democracy model in place now since 2016 is systematically the opposite as or fully opposite to that of the system structure of the normal liberal democracy model we had before 2016; and therefore, an extreme democratic outcome does not work while inside normal liberal democracy rules and institutions in which it came to exist; and this is why in order to work the extreme democratic outcome has to twist those normal rules and institutions or destroy them to create its own extreme rules and extreme institutions, which it needs to efficiently implement the wishes of the minority view.

And without this basic understanding of the paradigm shift that has taken place it is difficult for those inside the normal liberal democracy box to see the following: a) it is difficult to see the long term danger in which normal democratic values and institutions are while under extreme minority rule; and b) it is difficult to frame the way extreme liberal democracy works or the way it can slowly advance its minority view agenda; and use this understanding to uncover ways to guide effective opposition. This paper focuses on the 2016 extreme case in the USA or USEXIT with the election of President Trump, but the structures and implications apply to 2016 BREXIT too. Among the goals of this article is to point out the structure of Trumponomics, its meaning, and its expected local and global implications, both analytically and graphically.

Goals of the paper

1) To point out the structure of the shift from normal liberal democracy to the world of Trumponomics;
2) To highlight the structure of the world of Trumponomics, to define the meaning of Trumponomics, and to exalt its implications;
3) To stress the war structure that the world of Trumponomics needs to have active permanently in order to come to exist and/or to persist; and
4) To use this was structure to point out the expected local and global implications of Trumponomics.
Methodology

First, the terminology and operational concepts are shared. Second, the structure of the shift from normal liberal democracy to the world of Trumpconomics is given. Third, the structure of the world of Trumpconomics is highlighted and its meaning defined. Fourth, the war structure of the world of Trumpconomics is highlighted. Fifth, what to expect from Trumpconomics, locally and globally, is stressed using the war structure above. And finally, some food for thoughts and relevant conclusions are listed.

Terminology

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NDO = Normal democratic outcome  EDO = Extreme democratic outcome  
NLD = Normal liberal democracy  ELD = Extreme liberal democracy  
NDV = Normal democratic values  EDV = Extreme democratic values  
NEC = Normal economic thinking  EEC = Extreme economic thinking  
USEXIT = 2016 USA EDO  BREXIT = 2016 UK EDO  
TC = Trumpconomics  TCV = Trumpconomics values  
TEDO = USEXIT = Trump EDO  V = Voting system  
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Operational concepts

1) Democracy, system that aims at providing equal opportunity to elect, to be represented, and to share in the benefits to all its members;

2) True democracy, there is equal opportunity in all democratic aspects as the same time;

3) Partially distorted democracy, there is not equal opportunity in at least one democratic aspect;

4) Fully distorted democracy, there is inequality of opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;

5) Majority rule system, the electoral system where the majority rules decides the winner of democratic contexts;

6) Voters, each individual in the electoral system acting without complacency and who is committed to make sure his vote or her vote is counted in the determination of the democratic outcome with the goal to maintain or improve his current or future benefits and rights;

7) True majority, the actual number of voters who win the democratic context;

8) True minority, the actual number of voters who lose the democratic context;

9) Complacency, the social discontent or protest or frustration affecting opposing groups with the given democratic or electoral system choices that may lead voters from the true majority and/or the true minority to not vote at all or if they vote they go for a protest vote by either voiding their vote or shifting their vote to other choices in the belief that their party will still win or will still lose anyway without their vote or in the belief that their vote is just one vote anyway and it will not matter in the end result; Hence, complacency based voting is linked to pure dissatisfaction as voting behavior takes place without thinking much about the impact that this action may have in the end on the balance of current and future majority and minority democratic rights;

10) No complacency, the absence of social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral system that leads each voter from each group to vote for their preferred democratic choice to ensure his or her vote is counted, therefore no complacency based voting is linked either to ensuring the preservation and enhancing of current democratic rights in one group or linked to seeking the erosion or change of those rights or to slowing the pace of democratic chance in the other group;

11) Partial complacency, the partial social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is not widespread; some voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;
12) **Full complacency**, the general social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is widespread; many voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;

13) **True majority complacency**, it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;

14) **True minority complacency**, it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;

15) **True majority no complacency**, everybody in the true majority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;

16) **True minority no complacency**, everybody in the true minority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;

17) **Normal democratic outcome**, under no complacency or not protest behavior everybody votes and the true majority wins the democratic contest; governments retain or lose power without big surprises. Inclusion, openness, respect for the rule of law, equality, stability, integration, union, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good are the heart of normal democratic outcomes;

18) **Extreme democratic outcome**, under full true majority complacency or full true majority protest behavior the true minority wins the democratic context, governments lose or win power under a big surprise as the democratic option that seems impossible to happen wins the day. Exclusion, closeness, lack of respect for the rule of law, inequality, instability, separation, division, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority are the heart of extreme democratic outcomes;

19) **Internal complacency**, social discontent or protest or frustration generated by internal group divisions (e.g. divisive choice/leader selection);

20) **External complacency**, social discontent or protest or frustration generated by external group divisions (e.g. equally disliked competing choices/leaders);

21) **Full democracy**, a full inclusion model, a true democracy;

22) **Partial democracy**, a partial inclusion model, a distorted democracy;

23) **Democratic stability**, the tendency towards harmony associated with specific democratic outcomes;

24) **Full democratic stability**, the tendency towards full harmony associated with normal democratic outcomes;

25) **Full democratic instability**, the tendency towards zero harmony associated with extreme democratic outcomes;

26) **BREXIT**, the extreme democratic outcome supporting the UK withdrawing from the European Union;

27) **BREXISM**, the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of economic or territorial or state based unions;

28) **USEXIT**, the extreme democratic outcome supporting the USA withdrawing from the international and local order;

29) **USEXISM**, the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of the international and local order;

30) **EXISM**, the extreme democratic movements aiming at destroying majority rule based institutions, locally and globally;

31) **Democratic normalism**, the tendency of normal democratic outcomes to move towards more stable or balance democratic conditions through time as they seek
32) **Democratic extremism**, the tendency of extreme democratic outcomes to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible minority rule;

33) **Reaganomics**, the free trade and opposition to things such as debt and bail outs based economic thinking supporting the economic policies of President Reagan, a science based, non-gut based, stability based type of thinking;

34) **Trumpconomics**, the protectionist and welcoming of debt and bail outs based economic thinking behind the economic policies of President Trump, a non-science based, gut based, chaos based type of thinking;

35) **Brexeconomics**, the protectionist and welcoming of debt and bail outs based economic thinking behind the economic policies of Brexit in the UK, a non-science based, gut based, chaos based type of thinking;

The structure of the shift from normal liberal democracy to the world of Trumpconomics

If we make the following changes in Figure 2 above in the extreme liberal democracy structure at far right: a) we make the extreme democratic outcome represented by President Trump (EDO) be USEXIT, then we have EDO = USEXIT; b) we make the extreme economic thinking (EEC) be Trumpconomics (TC), then we have EEC = TC; c) we make the extreme democratic values (EDV) be the Trumpconomics values (TCV), then we have EDV = TCV, and d) we make the extreme stability linking environment be chaos, extreme environment = chaos, then with the information above we can generate the paradigm shift structure of the world of trumpconomics in the USA as indicated in Figure 4 below:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 4** The structure of the shift from the world of normal liberal democracy to the world of Trumpconomics

Figure 4 above let us see the 4 items that shift from normal to extreme: a) arrow 1 refers to the shift in the type of democratic outcome from normal democratic outcome (NDO) to an extreme democratic outcome called USEXIT, an outcome inconsistent with normal democratic institutions and rights inside which it comes to exist (NDO → USEXIT); b) arrow 2 shows the shift in the type of stability linking environment from stable to chaotic as indicated by the broken line in the world of Trumpconomics as chaos is needed to be present for the extreme outcome to come to exist and/or to continue in power (stable linking environment → chaos); c) arrow 3 highlights the shift in the type of values supporting the system from normal values such as respect of the rule of law, of science, of morality, and of minority rights to values reflecting contempt of the rule of law, of science,
of morality and of minority rights (NDV\(\rightarrow\)EDV); and d) arrow 4 indicates the shift in the type of economic thinking from normal economic thinking where free trade or global unity through freedom, peace and prosperity for all is good or tariff are bad for local consumers to an extreme economic thinking where free trade or global unity through freedom, peace, and prosperity for all is bad or tariff are good for local consumers (NEC\(\rightarrow\)EEC).

Hence, the world of trumpconomics exists to implement the best interest of the minority view that wins the democratic contest; and all those components above shift to achieve that goal, regardless of cost, including costs affecting those stakeholders or voters supporting the existence of Trumpconomics.

**Highlighting the structure of the world of Trumpconomics**

Hence the structure of the world of Trumpconomics after the shift can be indicated as in Figure 5 below:

![Figure 5](image-url)

**The world of Trumpconomics**

**Figure 5 The world of Trumpconomics**

Economic thinking (TC), value system (TCV) and extreme democratic outcome (USEXIT) under chaos (broken arrows).

Consistent with Figure 5 above, the world of Trumpconomics is made up by the extreme democratic outcome USEXIT with is supported by Trumpconomics (TC) and Trumpconomics values (TCV) in an environment of permanent chaos as indicated by the broken lines. All these components are there to make sure that the best interest of the minority view prevails in all forms of decision making, locally or globally, at all costs, no matter if the cost of implementing the shift affects those who supported the shift.

See that Trumpconomics is then the implementation of economic ideas inconsistent with mainstream economics with the goal of causing economic or market chaos for the benefit of a minority view in the development agenda regardless of who bear the costs of implementing such a minority view. In other words, the thinking behind normal democratic institutions, the thinking of normal economics, and the thinking behind normal democratic values, and the need for stability do not hold under extreme liberal democracy, which provides a rational for extreme democratic outcomes to change or transform or push normal liberal stakeholders into extreme conditions or destroy them.

Hence, for the actions of the USEXIT to reflect the best interest of the minority in the USA effectively it must be supported by the following tools: a) by an extreme economic thinking view like Trumpconomics (TC) and its protectionism ideas, b) by extreme democratic value view like Trumpconomics values (TCV), which
aims at using weak legal institutions or fake science or lack of morality or a dislike of minority rights or weak regulatory institutions or division, and c) all implemented in an environment of permanent targeted chaos: The destruction of normal liberal democracy components is a prerequisite for the consolidation, persistence, and proliferation of the world of Trumpconomics, where successfully implementing the best interest of the minority view that supports it is paramount, regardless of who bear the costs or perceptions.

The war structure of Trumpconomics

Consistent with the discussion above, to exist and to persist and to consolidate extreme democratic outcomes(Energy) like USEXIT need to establish a permanent war like structure to place normal democratic stakeholder/institutions(Normal Democracy Outcome), normal economic thinking(Normal Economic Thinking), normal democratic values(Normal Democratic Values), and the stable linking environment under constant targeted chaos to undermine the world of the normal liberal democracy(Normal Liberal Democracy), as indicated in Figure 6 below:

Figure 6 above allows us to see clearly how the world of Trumpconomics needs to be structured in order to keep relevant, persist, proliferate or consolidate its power. Based in Figure 6 above the world of Trumpconomics should be expected to attack the four components the normal liberal democracy as indicated as it feels they are in its way of implementing it minority view agenda: a) It will attack the nature of the normal democratic outcome and its normal democratic institutions or framework as indicated by arrow 1; b) it will attack the stability of the normal democratic outcome as indicated by arrow 2; c) it will attack the normal democratic values supporting the normal democratic outcome as indicated by arrow 3; and d) it will attack the economic thinking backing economic policies of the normal democratic outcome as indicated by arrow 4. Notice that just as normal democratic outcomes cannot function under extreme democratic conditions, extreme democratic outcomes cannot survive under normal democratic conditions. Hence, we should expect to see Trumpconomics focused on ways to destroy the fabric of normal liberal democracy using those four fronts highlighted in Figure 6 above at the same time.

Finally we can use Figure 6 above to highlight what to expect from Trumpconomics, locally and globally, to maintain or increase or consolidate its influence as indicated below:
The expected working of the world of Trumpconomics locally
We should expect the world of Trumpconomics to work hard on or give priority to removing or ignoring local normal democratic institutions and rights granted by normal democratic outcomes and governments to impose the rule of the minority view locally. This is because the world of Trumpconomics sees all the components of a normal liberal democracy locally as impediments to minority view rule in the USA. Therefore, we should expect the world of Trumpconomics to tend towards local democratic extremism.

The expected working of the world of Trumpconomics globally
We should expect the world of Trumpconomics to work hard on or give priority to changing or removing or ignoring global normal democratic institutions and rights granted by normal democratic outcomes and governments to impose the rule of the minority view globally. This is because the world of Trumpconomics takes all the components of a normal liberal democracy globally as impediments to minority view rule internationally. Hence, we should expect the world of Trumpconomics to tend towards global democratic extremism.

Summary:
Shifting from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy means shifting from normal conditions where the overall goal is to advance the best interest of the majority to extreme outcome conditions where the main aim is to advance the wellbeing of the minority view. Hence the coming of the world of Trumpconomics aims at ensuring the supremacy of a minority view in the USA, as implementing this task through normal democratic institutions, normal economic thinking, normal democratic values, and system stability is not easy or perhaps impossible, the world of normal liberal democracy needs to be transformed or destroyed to create the material the world of Trumpconomics needs to subsist and propagate. Hence, it is to be expected that the world of Trumpconomics will rely on permanent targeted chaos to succeed or that it will tend towards local and global democratic extremism.

Implications:
If normal liberal democracies are not protected against targeted chaos aimed at tricking the true majority component of society to induce general complacency the chances of extreme democratic outcomes taking place or to taking place again is high. If targeted chaos is reined in or not present in the democratic voting contest, there will be always a normal democratic outcome under majority rule with its own ideas on how to advance the will of the majority view. If extreme liberal democracies or outcomes lose their ability to generate targeted chaos; and therefore, they are not able to affect the wishes of the true majority then they should be expected to fade away.

Food for thoughts
a) Is the structure of the world of Trumpconomics the same as that of Brexconomics? I think yes, what do you think?; Is Reaganomics consistent with Trumpconomics? I think no, what do you think?; and c) Can Trumpconomics be seen as supply side management in chains? I think yes, what do you think?

Conclusions
First, it was shown that a shift from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy is a shift from normal to extreme in terms of the nature of the democratic outcome, the nature of the supporting economic thinking, the nature of the democratic values, and the nature of system stability. Second, it was indicated that the shift from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy leads to the four components of the world of Trumpconomics: the extreme democratic outcome, USEXIT; the extreme body of economic thinking, Trumpconomics; the extreme set of democratic values, Trumpconomics values; and the extreme stability environment, chaos. And third, it was pointed out that to consolidate or persist or propagate the world of Trumpconomics will attack all the components of the normal liberal democracy structure in which it came to exist to maintain permanent chaos as it cannot implement its minority view agenda locally and globally through inconsistent normal democratic institutions, normal economic thinking, normal democratic values and stability.
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