Education as the Institutional Means Towards Postmaterialism

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Abstract: This article describes education as the institutional means which directs the society towards Postmaterialism. Various studies on multiculturalism have agreed that democratic value is insufficient without welfare policies, the rise of religious intolerance is related with the widening of social gap in Indonesia. Secondary data on national statistics, surveys, and literature reviews are utilized to describe the accessibility and quality of education as related to Postmaterialism. Between the year 2005 and 2015, the author found in general the state has provided a wider access of education, but there is still a consistent low continuation rate because of poverty which impedes students to achieve higher education. On the other hand, the quality of education has encountered ideological tensions between intercultural values and Islamisation which happen to exist parallelly in the Reformation period; hence the potential for social disharmony and nationalism are still open to debate. The author suggests that the state should provide sustainable access towards higher education, both on secondary and tertiary level, and to provide monitoring and evaluative process on the pedagogical approach within public schools.

Keywords: Postmaterialism, Education, School Enrolment Rate, Islamisation

Introduction

Postmaterialism emphasises non-material goods such as the freedom of speech and tolerance in the society. Inglehart argues that if an individual has benefited sufficient amount of material currencies, such as economic security, he or she would be capable to exercise a higher plane of social necessity, namely religious tolerance, political tolerance, and the freedom of speech and opinion (Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Davis, 2000). It is often argued that Postmaterialists are more supportive for liberal rights and equal chance of competition for any individual as compared to materialists. Simply, one who does have stable economic life is able to embrace social and political tolerance. Education is one of the many means whose role is to convey cultural and non-material values. In this paper, I would like to examine the institution of education as the means to achieve Postmaterialism and social transformation.

Indonesia is currently experiencing arise of religious intolerance, and ironically, this happens after democratization (Menchik, 2016). While we assume that democracy should have had produced liberal and harmonious social integration, it might not always be the case in the non-Western hemisphere, particularly in developing states. Menchik have coined the term, “Godly Nationalism” as the unique Indonesian ideology to achieve national integration, also known as political imagined community (Menchik, 2014). And yet, the same cornerstone which had established the state, has indirectly affirmed the institutionalization of social intolerance. Religious nationalism has also fueled religious intolerance.

After the Reformation, various radical groups haven taken the democratic opportunity to express the resistance towards the state’s tolerant ideology - Pancasila (Shihab, 2017). Along the decades after the reformation, Indonesia is currently facing recurring waves of religious radicalism and violation of human rights; having 158 cases of religious rights violation, majority of these violations are in West Java (Komnas HAM, 2015; Wahid Institute, 2014; Pew Research Centre, 2016). The rise of intolerant groups addressing the literal interpretation of religiosity has caused social tension. Recently, various social movements have rose to resist the democratic state. These movements are not only joined by radical groups, but it is indirectly reinforced by para-state institutions (Bowen, 2010).

Despite fully aware of the ideological existence of Pancasila, various conservative groups have arrived to deconstruct the national ideology, and construct an alternative ideology according to their respective interests. These social movements participate in the social-political arena, some enrolled themselves as militia-type groups in the social domain, while others are enrolled in the political sphere, competing influence along with the moderate Islamic organisations, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (Abdurrahman, 2013; Hadiz, 2010). Generally, the objective is to build an Islamic state; if not, a semi-Islamic state. Without fully recognizing Indonesia’s cultural diversity; these movements somehow neglect the fundamental definition of intercultural citizenship (Leeuwen, 2010). Now, it is inevitable to question Indonesia’s modern Islam, which unknowingly has revealed the latent potential for social disharmony. The transition towards liberal democracy still raises the
issue of social distrust and worrying inconsistency with citizenship autonomy, or rather, freedom of minority groups (Almagor, 2000; Ciftci, 2010).

The rise of such conservative groups is not without a cause. One major factor which impedes Indonesia’s stagnant democratization is social exclusion. Daniel Byman has warned that financial crisis, poverty, and economic inequality are capable to make many people believe that the governmental system is bound for changes (Graff, 2010). Indonesia’s widening social gap between economic classes has been vulnerable towards religious ideological attacks (Putra, 2013: 70). Indeed, since the year 2000, economic growth has taken a greater leap, but the benefit has not been distributed equally. According to some researches, Indonesia was ranked sixth worst inequality of wealth - marking a Gini ratio of 0.394 by September 2016; the richest one percent of the total population owned 49% of the state’s total wealth (OECD, 2015; Oxfam, 2017; The Asia Foundation, 2016). The effect of economic inequality has produced social uncertainty, particularly towards conservative groups (Arifianto, 2016).

Since there is a wild current of economic fluctuation, we arrive at the question on how is the state is coping with such changes? The notion of democracy promises equal chance for every citizen to benefit freedom from the state. Therefore, it is highly unlikely for the state to convey the message of multicultural harmony if the social situation betrays the ideological basis for equal social-economic freedom (Kymlicka, 2012). The accumulation of social resentments towards the anomic and incomplete state of democratisation would result in a greater number of social conflicts and potential disintegration.

There are already several comments which touched the ideological trend on religion and economic inequality, but I consider the theoretical gap between economic inequality and intolerance is still a bit too far. Economic inequality may produce social resentments, but the failure of materiality alone cannot provide adequate explanation for Postmaterial incapability. Education is the prior point of the society’s take off towards Postmateriality – the “meeting point” between the material (economy) and non-material pole (culture). I do find it quite convincing that the Postmaterial analysis on education can help us trace the institutional connection between democracy, social inclusion, and social transformation. Thus, there are two major questions which the author attempts to answer on the issue of Postmaterialism: 1. How do we perceive education as a material value? 2. How do we perceive education as a Postmaterial value?

Methodology

The analysis on this paper will rely on two types of secondary data, quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative data analysis will take an examination on the Indonesian educational access based on the National Statistic Centre (Badan Pusat Statistik). Quantitative data would allow the author to see how far the material has been achieved by the state, providing economic security and infrastructural access towards education. On the other hand, to examine Postmaterial values such as social tolerance, the communication of civic values within the educational institution will be mostly made up of qualitative data collected from various literature reviews and the author’s previous research.

Postmaterialism and Social Inclusion: A Sociological Framework

The premise of Postmaterialism states that the change of social value depends on economic security (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994). Inglehart also correlate this concept as synonymous with the phrase “Silent Revolution”. He found that after the Post-War period on 1970-1990’s, Western societies has experienced a latent change of paradigm from Materialism to Postmaterialism, a shift from general need of basic economic necessity towards a higher form of social needs such as the freedom of speech, political preferences, and others.

Inglehart’s Postmaterialism leans heavily on Maslow’s psychology. Maslow did argue that the change of an individual human behaviour depends heavily on the satisfaction of basic needs (Van Deth, 1983). By distinguishing material and non-material needs into two different phases of individual’s necessity, Inglehart has been able to trace the shift of social values along the long railroad of modernity. The more modern and secure the society’s economical condition, as he argued, will have a higher concern for Postmaterialism. This transition into modernity is understood as the “Silent Revolution”, the paradigm shift towards Postmaterialism.

Inglehart’s argument on Postmaterialism port rays the parallel movement of modernity and democracy, democracy may be regarded as the modern ideology while it is aided with the economic security provisions. But, Inglehart has yet to provide an adequate explanation on an institutional level. Since Inglehart’s argument is constructed on psychological ground, his thesis is unable rise higher than the individual level of analysis (Mckenzie, 2004; Nickens, 2004). Somehow, there is an indirect link which is yet to elaborate how an

individual’s Postmaterialistic preference have a direct impact towards democratic values. Although his writing may show the trend of Postmaterialistic atmosphere in the Western society, the shift towards modern democracy and social inclusion still requires a dose of sociological explanation.

The correlation between Postmaterialism and social inclusion lies in the premise that every individual should have the equal chance to benefit both material and non-material goods (Morselli & Passini, 2012). Material goods may include basic economic needs such as nutrition, minimum wage/income, etc, this is to say that an individual should live above the poverty line, living above the “safety net” of the society. On the other hand, Marshall’s thesis on citizenship rights (Civil, Social, Political rights), for an example, fall closer into the category of non-material goods (Marshall, 1950). This is to say that the Maslow’s psychological approach towards the pyramid of needs, from material to non-material goods, is not limited to the individual but it may be relevant to be projected into the collective group. To make the statement more sociologically sound, I would argue that the society follows the Parson’s thought on social structure, AGIL (Adaptation, Goal Orientation, Integration, Latency). The society operates like the individual, its mechanics requires “concrete” economic satisfaction (material), correlating with the “abstract” cultural latency (post-material).

Previous studies have proven that countries which experienced economic inequality are incapable to grasp democratic culture (Brym, 2016; Inglehart, 2008). These studies shared a common theme that if the West is modern and non-West is less modern, then Postmaterialism would appear in the West because the society is living on a better social-economic condition. In other words, the West’s “already rich” material atmosphere has become the basis for latent social transformation, giving birth towards a denser democratic culture where the individual is given more liberal space to express their own autonomy. But, we must also be aware that the West have not reached this state without a long period of socio-historical progress. As compared to the West, Third World Countries such as Indonesia, I assume, is currently developing towards Postmaterialism along the modernization railroad.

**Education: The Take Off Towards Postmaterialism**

Education is a major social institution which can convey Postmaterial values. Education has a function, and the potential for transformation. It is expected that students who graduate from school do not only participate in voluntary work for economic purposes, but also to participate in civility – in the free expression of speech, tolerance, and other non-material values. Several studies argued that economic situation alone is insufficient to drive an individual’s preference towards Postmaterialism. Non-material culture should be introduced into the curriculum through educational means (Ecklund, 2012; Hansen & Tol, 2003; Hellevik, 1993).

And yet, at the same time, it is highly unlikely for one to access educational materials if one’s basic economic needs have not been met. In this situation, I would like to argue that the meeting point, or the intersectionality between the material and Postmaterial pole, is in the access education. Education is the means to convey non-material civil values, and education is the prior representation of material satisfaction. Because of this, I do think it is important to evaluate how education convey democratic values in Indonesia, and particularly, why education has not yet completed its task to teach social inclusion.

To achieve such task, we must measure how far has the state directs education towards Postmaterialism. Schools are not built just to boast a statistical existence that the state has recorded a crude amount of educational access, but schools should also be supported and nourished with a higher standard of pedagogical quality. If the state focuses on how many school buildings are built, the state’s intention is still stuck on the issue of providing basic economic and pedagogy needs and have not yet achieve a higher plane of qualitative education. Postmaterialism does not only operate on the ideological level, but also only the institutional – on democracy and social welfare, and in the classrooms.

The analysis on Postmaterialism and education will be divided into two major parts. The first part will examine the material accessibility of education. The second part will describe the Postmaterial quality of education. The former refers towards the crude access to enter schools, such factor can be indicated by the level of educational participation. The latter, on the other hand, is to describe how far has the institution of education convey civic values, tolerance, etc which does not only require access, but also describes the quality of learning. In each part, the author would like to discover on both the positive and negative aspect, on what has been achieved and not achieved by the state on promoting education, in its access and quality.

**Education as Material Value: Statistical Findings on Its Access**

We have discussed that materiality is an important denominator to transit the society into Postmateriality. But what do we mean by education as a material value? I would like to state that if education is a material value, then education is the means to achieve economic security, and vice versa. Simply put, education is to be considered as a basic need which every individual should have access to just like attaining other forms of necessity. The accessibility to attain education, and higher education, falls into this category.
Accessibility speaks about how the democratic state has include every citizen into the institution, but it has not yet touch the topic of culture, latency, nor civic values.

Indonesia is a democratic state. It is therefore a logical consequence for the state to provide equal access for education, as it is written in the constitution (UUD 1945, Chapter 28 C). This imply that the state should distribute equal access and quality of education for every citizen. I do find it important to utilize some data from the Indonesian Statistical Center (Badan Pusat Statistik), the to potray how the state distribute access of education Through these datas, we might have at least obtained the minimum prospect to scan how far has the state distributed the materiality of education for its citizens.

The graphic 1 above depicts the overall School Enrolment Rate (SER) in Indonesia between the year 2005 and year 2015. If we would observe the line (SER All Ages), Indonesia has experienced a rise in School Enrolment Rate, beginning with only 62.12% on the year 2005 and have reached 70.91% by the year 2015. Along the decade, it does appear that School Enrolment Rate has ascend consistently, there is a total rise of 8.79% throughout the period. On one hand, I would argue that the accessibility for education has increased formidably as the trend above has suggested, but there are further notes which must be elaborated.

I have also differentiated School Enrolment Rates into different age groups. School Enrolment Rate for Ages 7-12 (Primary/Elementary Education) has not experience very tremendous changes since practically almost every Indonesian citizen are able to enjoy basic educational threshold. Primary education has changed from 97.14% – 98.59%, an increase of 1.45%. On the other hand, the School Enrolment Rate for Ages 13-15 (Lower Secondary Education) has increased from 84.02% – 94.59%, an increase of 10.57%. In addition, the School Enrolment Rate for Ages 16-18 (Senior Secondary Education) have encountered the greatest improvement from 53.86-70.32%, an increase of 16.46%.

On the positive aspect, these statistical data tell that there is different scale, or gradation, of improvements within each respective level of education. The School Enrolment Rate does not only state how many students are attending schools, but these rates also explain the accessibility – the amount of educational infrastructure made available for students to participate. There might be not much improvement in the elementary threshold since it is already high at the beginning, but there are higher levels of improvement in the lower and higher secondary education; elementary education having the lowest improvement, followed by the lower secondary threshold, and higher secondary threshold experiencing tremendous rise of student participation.

There are several factors which have led to the increase of School Enrolment Rate, one of which is Compulsory Study Policy. This policy varies from different period of governance. Since the year 1994, it has been declared that Compulsory Study should be made up to Nine-Year (Up to lower secondary education) (Firman & Tola, 2008). And by the year of 2011, reports have shown that a huge sum of financial resources have been prepared to tackle the problem of access. The central government have issues the 12 Years Policy
through the ministry of education and culture to strengthen scholarship distributions (Lestari et al, 2015).

Although the initial expectation of such policies is to produce a 97 percent Crude Participation Rate for secondary education by the year 2020, it has already made one when regular citizens are able to enjoy better access on primary and secondary education as shown above.

The goal of this program is to develop education in Indonesia, to improve equity and access. Based on the findings above, I do find convincing that the state had shown its performance to achieve the first objective. But, the accessibility of education may not be stable throughout different levels of education. The government have provided infrastructural and scholarship support for education, and yet, there is a consistent trend throughout the decade that School Enrolment Rates decline whenever students attempt to reach a higher level of education. There is a gap between the 12 Year Compulsory Study Policy and the increasing dropout rate throughout the increasing age groups. Primary school students are unable to continue studying for lower secondary education, and so on. The overall access of education has improved, but the access and continuation for higher education is still quite stagnant.

Causes of Low Continuation Rate

Graphic 2. Household Expenditure on Senior Secondary Education as % of Total Household Expenditures, by Income Quintile

In the previous section, I have stated that the government has provided policies which promote the accessibility of education. It is quite questionable how students experience low continuation rate even if the state has already reserved 20% of the national budget for educational purposes. It seems odd in the first place when the supply side has provided enough funds for scholarship to cover up tuition fees. Nevertheless, it does appear that there are more factors which result in greater cost outside the expected equation; the subsidy provided by the government may not always cover other form of household expenses related to educational access in a public, state-controlled, senior secondary education. The supply and demand side seem to not meet very properly.

As it is shown in graphic 2, the demand side of higher secondary education reflects the necessary expense outside the government’s subsidy. The poorest quintile having the minimum household expense of Rp. 2,500,000 while the richest quintile would have a higher expense of Rp. 3,500,000. The weight of expense in such secondary education is still quite burdensome for Indonesian citizens who are already at an initial economic disadvantage (The World Bank, 2000). The problem of materiality, economic security, are still obstacles for individuals to achieve higher levels of education.

And when students have achieved “employable age” to work, individuals tend to lose interest for higher education, and later participate in the informal labors to attain immediate income (Moeliodihardjo, 2014; Weston, 2008). The attrition during the transition of various educational levels depend heavily on the initial household welfare and employment opportunities. This eventually results in the higher probability for students to give up schooling and move towards economic labor (Suryadarma, et al, 2006). The entrance into informal jobs may provide economic income, but it is not at all promising to exercise upward social mobility (Pattinasarany, 2012).

From these data, I would like to argue that education as a material value – as an infrastructural access has experienced a general trend of improvement. But, the transition towards higher education (lower, senior
secondary education and college/university threshold) has not been satisfactory. On the supply side, the state has not calculated the household expenses outside the budget which has burdened individuals originating from disadvantaged groups. These expenses cannot be fully covered by the state, and thus rendering students and parents from fully participating in school.

On the demand side, the reality of material value is still superior. Individuals felt the urgency to secure economic income as a greater priority than to continue education. Students, having reached the employable age of 15, would leave schools and obtain a job, even an informal one. Teachers in public general secondary school also had to sacrifice more time on second jobs (2.7 hours per week) after their period of teaching in the classrooms (17 hours per week) (The World Bank, 2012). This explains that not only students have to work to earn extra wages, but teachers too experience economic insecurity which result in a lower focus for educative purposes. The welfare of both students and teachers have yet to reach a material line of satisfaction.

This remarks that students who study in class appear to orient themselves towards material values more than Postmaterial. Education is still a means for economic end, thus explaining the continual decline in the secondary education when both teachers and students are more prone to search for secondary occupations to earn a living. On the other part, the state has focused improvement in distributing educational access as a material equity, as it was represented by the statistics; the quantitative data alone could only show the dispense of school infrastructure. The next section would examine how Postmaterialism is being discussed and conveyed within the school’s public sphere.

**Postmaterialism in Class: Cases of Ideological Tension**

This section discusses on the civic message socialized in schools. Not all non-material values are Postmaterialism because Postmaterialism leans towards liberal democratic culture. I could see how the disparity of educational access has become the first vulnerable point as I reply to the increasing number of radical social adherents. Since more individuals are forced to secure economic incomes (material values), and yet unable to continue competing in the social ladder, social resentments would rise and come as protests towards the democratic state. Even though the state has attempted to provide educational equity for every citizen, the low continuation rate along educational levels may become the crucial for economic inequality and social conflicts.

In addition, radical ideologies may not only appear because of low continuation rate, but it may be induced within the educational institution, threatening Postmaterial values. Radical ideologies are non-material values as well but it is referred as a negative counterpart towards the liberal Postmaterial side. To trace how civic values are threatened inside the educational institution, it would be necessary to bring up the topics on the Multiculturalization and Islamisation of the state’s ideology. These two words represents the current social situation in Indonesia, but it might as well become the discourse which have been first reproduced within the educational ground/arena. This section on the Postmaterial analysis will first begin with the multiculturalization phenomenon, followed by Islamization after the Post-Authoritarian period.

I would like to use the term “intercultural” to describe the process of social inclusion. Islamization is related with religious conservatism. It is quite interesting to first note how these two words are the ideal type of the Indonesian intercultural society. Menchik (2016) stated that religious nationalism mixes both religion and secular nationalism into one singular political imagined community in Indonesia. Therefore, it is not uncommon for us to observe that Indonesian nationalism sometimes is identified by certain groups as intercultural, and by some others, Islamic Orthodoxy. By assuming the Postmaterial argument, it is more likely to categories social tolerance into the intercultural inclusion.

Previous studies have discussed that the escalating violence in the society has already began after the Reformation, the increasing density of Islamization in the governmental institution rose as a counter-reaction towards the repressive anti-Islamic Authoritarian period. Islamization entered the state’s institution, and thus through its apparatus, this religious trend had influenced the institution of education. In return, the effect of religious conservatism has also reduced the educational capacity to convey intercultural values, namely social and religious tolerance (Railhani 2011). In other words, the tension between intercultural citizenship and Islamization do not only reflect the resistance against democracy on the ideological ground, it is also practiced within the educational institution itself.

The second cause of such trend is not always caused by the state, but by each school units. Recently in the Reformation period, the School-Based Management (SBM) program have provided more freedom and autonomy for each school to determine their own affairs. The decentralization of education institution, although is a more democratic scheme, it is more prone to be infiltrated by religious conservatism. Islamization has gained the momentum to project an Islamic expression within the Indonesian public schools. The effect of democratization may not always lead towards Postmaterialism where students are engaged in social tolerance and intercultural citizenship, but into other forms of non-materiality.
Keast (2006) has provided a frame of multilevel analysis on governmental and institutional level of education vision and policies. This analytical framework allows us to observe the conflict of values – the ideological tension between intercultural citizenship and Islamization. Based on graphic 3, it is found the state has formulated four Postmaterial values which become the pillar for cultural latency: spiritual intelligence, social-emotional intelligence (this includes social tolerance), intellectual intelligence, and kinesthetic intelligence (putting knowledge into practical situations). Based on these values, I would like to point out that spiritual intelligence, otherwise known as religiosity, tend to have difficulty to embrace with other forms of intelligence one of which is the social-emotional intelligence where social tolerance fall into this category.

It is also the same vision, perhaps if interpreted by religious orthodoxy, this particular point on “religious education” justify and reproduce the Islamization of public schools. Although this value was meant to imply that religious freedom is a crucial element to construct Indonesia’s democratic anatomy, it may not always be the case in the Reformation period; Islamization seems to grow as had the historical trend has suggested. And eventually, the same repercussive effect was passed down and adopted by each individual school unit. In one particular school in the Depok region, the school’s vision & mission reflect the state’s policies, practiced it in an Islamic fashion for religious learning, and also implemented such religious culture in the school’s public sphere (Kurniawan, 2017).

The increasing density of Islamic culture within the public schools have produced some alarming issues. It is often found, that in some public schools, the social intolerance has become part of the culture. Intolerance, may not always lead towards destructive violence nor coercion just as David Little (2001, quoted by Fuad, 2007) has proposed, but intolerance still consist the act of forbearance and have not yet reach the willingness to accept other cultural norms (Bretherton, 2004). Ultimately, the cultural dominance of a certain group results in a non-coercive form of violence, symbolic violence, where non-Muslim students although are free to express their opinions, their inferior stance are not fully welcomed implicitly into the cultural arena due to the strong current of Islamisation (Connoly & Healy, 2004; Schubert, 2002)

Based on my interviews, I have found students opinions that symbolic violence, the weakening of Postmaterialism, is found in school. The school’s bureaucratic system although has openly accepted the Christian student community (Rokris) on the same equal ground as the Islamic student community (Rohis), the administrative principle has once produced arbitrary policies which undermine minority student activities such as the freedom of worship. Second, the informal culture as it has already been regulated and maintained, discourage non-Muslim students to participate in the student presidency position (Ketua OSIS), let alone to receive a major election from Muslim students (Kurniawan, 2017).

It is understood that civic education is an important means for students to know democratic values and to embrace mutual respect as a civic value (Chzhen, 2013; Kirikhham, 2016; Leeman, 2008; Martin, 2013; Tan, 2007) On the contrary, the current situation where civic education is overwritten by overwhelmingly strong Islamic culture could impede Postmaterial theme in education. The message on harmony, tolerance, and national solidarity, if not consistent with intercultural practices, would remain anomic and a normative textbook formality. Pancasila and other forms of Postmaterial values are external ideas from the students, and remain as so, since the cultural factors impede the internalization of such values into the subjects.
Substantive Islam as a Means for Postmaterialism

Although Islamization has become a momentum in the democratic period, and sometimes raises worrying circumstances, Hefner (2009), based on his researches, have also argued that the Islamic religion can become a means to direct the students towards democratization. Opposing Bruce’s argument (Furseth & Repstad, 2006: 99) that Islam and Democracy are two incompatible poles of political culture, Hefner’s research on Islamic Education and Modern Muslim echoes Menchik’s initial statement on “Godly Nationalism” (Hefner, 2009). Hefner found an impressive result that most Muslim public and educators which he had surveyed, have shown a general agreement towards democracy.

Table 1. Muslim Attitudes on Democracy and Islam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Support for Democracy</th>
<th>Year 2004(^2)</th>
<th>Year 2006(^3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Democracy, compared to other forms of governance, is the best form of government for a country like ours (Indonesia).</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Democracy is a source of political disorder</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Every citizen is equal before the law regardless of his or her political views.</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Every citizen should be allowed to join any political organization</td>
<td>79.5%</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mass media should be protected by law from arbitrary actions of government.</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
<td>92.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Our economy will be better if the government gives more freedom to each citizen to do as he or she wishes.</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Free and fair contestation between political parties improves the performance of government of this country</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Support for Shari’ah and Islam</th>
<th>Year 2004</th>
<th>Year 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Islamic governance, i.e., governance based on the Qur’an and Sunna under the leadership of Islamic authorities, is the best for this nation.</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The state should enforce the obligation to implement Islamic law (shari’a) for all Muslims.</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The amputation of the hand of a thief as prescribed in the Qur’an should be enforced by the government.</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>In general elections Muslims should only elect candidates who understand and fight for the implementation of Islamic teachings in the polity.</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>In general elections voters should only support Islamic parties.</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Muslims who do not perform their religious duties should not be allowed to be members of the People’s Consultative Assembly or Parliament.</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The ideals and practices of Islamic organizations (such as Darul Islam, Negara Islam Indonesia, Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad, etc.) to implement Islamic law (shari’a) in the society and polity should be supported.</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The practices of polygamy should be allowed.</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Females should not be allowed to take long trips without being accompanied by a close family member or relative.</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>The government (police) should engage in surveillance as to make sure that Muslims perform the Ramadan fast.</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>The government (police) should close restaurants during Ramadan.</td>
<td>69.3%</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>The government (police) should engage in surveillance (mengawasi) to make sure that two persons (male and female) walking together in the street are either married or relatives.</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) 2004 percentages are based on a survey of 1000 members of the general Muslim public in eight provinces across Indonesia.

\(^3\) 2006 data are based on a survey of 940 Muslim teachers in secondary-level Islamic schools (madrasas and pesantrens) in eight provinces.
Based on Hefner’s survey on the year 2004 and 2006, we can see that 85.9% of Muslim educators agree on democracy as the best form of government in Indonesia. At the same time, the similar respondents have also agreed towards the implementation of Islamic governance by the state, 72.2% of the overall Muslim educators have agreed on this topic. Furthermore, the Muslim public and Islamic educators, has shown high agreeableness on the practice of democracy. Higher than 70% from each respective group have shown positive alignment with democratic values; only 7 - 8.1% responds that democracy is the source of political disorder.

On the contrary, the same survey reflects the potential for Postmaterial disability. The same percentile, 70% of the total respondents, agree that religious authority suits best for national regulation. While the Muslim public partially agrees towards supporting Islamic values, I sensed that there is a higher tendency for Muslim educators stressing a stricter practice of conservative religiosity in the public sphere. It is shown in the survey, in the category “support for Shari’a and Islamism”, that there is a higher percentile in almost of every item where Muslim educators promote Islamism in political, social, gender, and personal aspects of Indonesian public life. Thus, with the full awareness that Islamism is inseparable from Indonesian democracy. the questions retain: how do we reconcile these two differing views? How could democracy and Islam share the same part in the Postmaterial territory.

On the Western perspective, Islam is incompatible with the Western democracy. However, the Indonesian ideology (Pancasila) has prepared accomadations for both conflicting values; The indigenization of Western democracy into the Indonesian social historical context gave birth to its own unique trait, and this ideology becomes the Postmaterial bay which withhold different and mixing forms of cultural diversities. The first point of Pancasila (Belief in the One and Only God) encompasses the possibility for Godly Nationalism and religious freedom, and also the implementation of the Islamic belief (Akidah). And on the fourth point (Democracy Guided by the Unanimity Amongst Representatives), it encourages the collective form of political decision, similar to the notion of the Western democracy.

The transition towards Postmaterialism can be achieved when intercultural democracy is conveyed in the field of education. Since Islam, and perhaps other religious groups, have generally agreed to the state’s ideology, it is therefore a possibility to join religious value in harmony with democratic and civic values. I would assume that the survey above suggests that the concrete form of Indonesian governance is best with democracy, while most Muslim educators would agree that the substantive value of Islam (shari’a) can also promote the solidarity of the state, affirming its essential point in the Pancasila.

The issue of Postmateriality now comes whether Muslim educators are able to convey similar message towards the students. Hefner (2009) have argued that Muslim educators should receive higher education in order to balance these two differing views between democracy and Islam, so thus to synergies them, and be made understood in the classrooms. Baidhawy (Symsiyatun & Siregar, 2013) have suggested that social harmony, a reflection of the ideological solidarity, should be supported by the state through the form of multicultural theory-based religious education. It is because religious education has often been misused to limit religious freedom. Religious education, according to him, should be sensitive towards diversities, and should shift from just religious learning into interreligious dialogue.

The challenge for Indonesia today may not always end on the material issue of education access, but on the Postmaterial factor of education quality. Not all educators are very concerned on pedagogy, as it has already been stated above, to meet a day’s earning might still be difficult, let alone to pour higher concentration on civic and religious education. On the material factor, Indonesian teachers still focus more on technical requirements, finishing checklists of bureaucratic demands. On the non-material, educators may be ignoring the important aspect of Pancasila’s intercultural value, or worse, having no careful attention towards the penetration of alternative ideologies in schools. These radical movements enter through both methods: one from reading materials which suggest literal interpretation, and second through external actors which recruit students as adherents into their circles (Rokhmadi, 2012). Teacher and school managers are encouraged to be aware, critical, and evaluative to such growing issues. Should they not be careful, as the survey has proven, some teachers (64.4%) might also slip into the less democratic category, possibly injuring the transition towards Postmaterialism.

**Discussion**

Postmaterialism began with a psychological approach to examine the individual’s shifting orientation from economic security towards social security. This notion follows the modernization theory which claims that as the society progresses from developing to developed railway, the sustainable economic atmosphere would inevitable produce a higher form of social value, namely social tolerance, civility, and democracy. The freedom
of speech is more appreciated by Postmaterialist, while the freedom of economy is appreciated by materialists. If we would picture the term “Material” and “Postmaterial”, it appears to follow Marx’s economic determinism whereby the economic material is the basis to support ideology, education, and other forms of social institutions in the higher Postmaterial platform. However, as this article has suggested economy alone is insufficient to boost the developing state into Postmaterial nature; education is an important institution to smoothen the transition.

There is still one major issue which have not been explored in this paper which requires further research. The author is unable to explain how middle-class Muslim societies disagree with Postmaterialism. Agreeing on the concept of Postmaterialism, we should have expected that most middle-class populist would be more democratic, civil, liberal, etc. However, the current issues in Indonesia today shows that intolerance persists even after material satisfaction which suggests that other social factors have also come into the “social equation”.

Based on that social phenomenon, I would like to suggest that since the concept of Postmaterialism began in the more homogenous Western society, it may be unsuitable to capture societal change in the cultural heterogenous society in developing countries. Therefore, if the author is to borrow Parson’s view on the society, the author would argue that culturally heterogenous society not only requires economic satisfaction (Adaptation), but also to be supported with cultural modification (Latency). Cultural modification can be located in the cultural apparatus such as the educational institution. Intercultural education may be required to support the transition towards Postmaterial atmosphere in Indonesia.

There are several points which I would like to suggest some possible recommendations on the Indonesian education. First, as I touch the issue of educational accessibility, I would like to recommend that the accessibility should be distributed horizontally and vertically. Horizontal distribution requires the spread of educational infrastructure throughout the national region, in both urban and rural areas, to avoid possible social disparity in geographical terms. Vertical distribution suggests that secondary and tertiary education should be made more accessible (not just compulsory), by calculating other forms of household expenses which have not been covered by the state, encouraging both students and parents to participate in school, reducing low continuation rate and increasing school Enrolment rate. The state should also increase the teachers’ welfare condition, thus to avoid them having secondary jobs. Likewise, providing higher teacher education and material access so they would not have to worry on bureaucratic task, but to focus on essential learning processes.

Second, on the educational quality, I would like to recommend that state should not ignore the decentralized stance of school management, particularly after the democratization period since it is already vulnerable towards alternative ideologies. The state should participate in formulating curriculum which not only touch the normative aspect of the state’s ideology, but also to engage continuously in formulating learning methods and multicultural forums, assisting both teachers and students to discuss, criticize, and internalize Postmaterial values. Postmaterial values may not be crudely lean towards liberal democracy, nor to just religious education, but also on intercultural citizenship learning. Postmaterialism is not just transferred through the infrastructure and availability of textbooks, but the cultural atmosphere within the school. Thus, the state should balance the centralization of educational institution to monitor and evaluate schools’ learning environments.

**Conclusion**

Postmaterialism is a perspective to measure the degree of social inclusion in Indonesia. Social inclusion encompasses both material and non-material satisfaction, covering economic security and citizenship. The institution of education, based on its accessibility and pedagogical quality, is one means to measure the transition from material towards Postmaterialism. Based on its material aspect, educational access has become more distributed although with difficulties to achieve secondary and higher threshold. While on its Postmaterial aspect, the process of education in class requires the educators’ active role on conveying civic values, intercultural dialogues, and national solidarity; considering that there are also ideological tensions on both intercultural and Islamic values in the public schools. Postmaterialism not only based on economic conditions; further researches should also consider other social factors such as intercultural education, to strengthen the transition towards a more democratic culture.
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References


